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This article-based dissertation investigates the relationship between 
professional journalism and democracy after the financial crisis and the euro 
crisis. The dissertation is motivated by the notion that the ability of 
professional journalism to facilitate democratic public communications is 
undermined by various factors. Technologically, journalism is being 
challenged by the breakdown of nationally regulated media environments, 
innovations in communication technologies, and the abundance of online 
content that often circumvents any ethical guidelines characteristic of 
professional journalism. Business-wise, the fact that mass publics are 
presented with unlimited options to professional journalism means that 
publishers can no longer exploit the lucrative bottlenecks between audiences 
and information and turn these opportunities into newspaper subscriptions 
and advertisement sales.  
Politically, professional journalism is challenged by the social and 
economic turmoil that has undermined the legitimacy of established political 
forces and experts in the aftermath of the economic crisis. The financial crisis, 
the euro crisis, and the austerity measures that facilitated to combat the crises 
fragmented the political landscape of Western societies and brought into 
question some of the central tenets of liberal thought, such as political 
integration and economic globalization. The widespread anger toward elites—
often said to be manifested by the Trump presidency or the Brexit process—
seems to be directed toward journalists as well. With decreasing trust in 
media, journalists are often seen as stooges of a failing elite who are out of 
touch with ordinary people.  
These concerns are illustrated by the grim analyses on the state of 
democratic public communications. It is even stated that the breakdown of the 
communication architecture regulated by professional journalists is paving 
the way for a “post-truth” world where expertise is irrelevant and rational 
deliberation is no longer possible. Instead of facts and critical analyses, mass 
publics are presented with fake news driven by populist passions or opaque 
algorithms with no respect for liberal democracy.  
Amid these concerns, journalists and journalism scholars are faced with 
burning questions on journalism and its democratic functions. In an age 
characterized by declining media trust, radical political antagonisms, and 
technological rupture, how can journalism fulfil its democratic mission and 
work as a common communication architecture that would foster deliberation, 
provide people with analyses and information, and hold the powerful 
accountable?  
This thesis argues that to enhance the democratic power of journalism, a 
critical analysis of the journalism–democracy nexus is in order. To move 
beyond the standard notions about the democratic importance of watchdog 
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journalism, it should be noted that the relationship between journalism and 
democracy has always been ridden with contradictions. 
 This thesis addresses the relationship between journalism and democracy 
via a synopsis and four case studies that deal with the austerity policies that 
quickly began dominating European economic policy-making after the 
financial crisis. The thesis argues that the 2010 turn to austerity—after a brief 
period of economic stimulus—marks a watershed moment for liberal Western 
societies. Austerity policies further undermined established political 
formations and opened a space for alternative political projects in the form of 
right-wing anti-immigrant sentiment or left-wing economic populism.  
The synopsis chapter begins with an overview of professional journalism. 
To understand the current turmoil of journalism, it is essential to understand 
the history of professional journalism as well as the political and technological 
cornerstones of the profession. Moreover, the synopsis chapter addresses the 
democratic functions of journalism via the different traditions of democratic 
theory. It also presents an overview of the financial crisis and the euro crisis 
and discusses the relationship between journalism and the economy.  
The empirical case studies argue that instead of fostering a pluralist debate 
on austerity, European journalism echoed the narrative on the inevitable 
nature of austerity policies. To be sure, journalists also presented critical 
austerity analyses and criticized the hardline German stance on austerity; 
however, overall, journalism was dominated by the “necessary austerity” 
narrative. 
Article I argues that the German government, arguably the most important 
player in the European economic policy-making, was able to use European 
newspapers to present the euro crisis as a crisis of public indebtedness and 
deteriorating competiveness that needed to be tackled with austerity and 
competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms. Article I argues that despite 
national differences, the “German view” on the euro crisis was the dominant 
way of making sense of the crisis in European newspapers.  
Article II argues that the Finnish debate on economic policy-making was 
dominated by the Ministry of Finance and the European Union—both of whom 
argued that austerity was needed to combat the economic predicament. 
Further, Article II argues that as the political elites coalesced around the 
austerity consensus, it was difficult for journalism to present the public with 
alternative viewpoints on austerity. Some economists, for example, publicly 
criticized the timing and scaling of austerity, but overall, the journalistic 
debate on Finnish austerity was dominated by the austerity consensus.  
Articles III and IV argue that journalism has historically represented 
austerity as a necessary fix to economic woes. Austerity has been in order to 
modernize European welfare states to meet the demands set by a competitive 
global economy. Moreover, political opposition to austerity has been often 
represented as populist or selfish. However, journalism has also criticized 
dogmatic austerity, as illustrated by the criticism toward Germany’s tough 
austerity stance amid the European economic crisis.  
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Finally, the thesis argues that it is important to move beyond mere 
journalism criticism, which easily turns into cynicism and leads to the 
dismissal of journalism as inherently anti-democratic. Therefore, the synopsis 
chapter of the thesis draws from the political philosopher Chantal Mouffe, 
according to whom democratic public life is characterized by the existence of 
differing hegemonic projects. By building on Mouffe’s insights and the 
individual case studies, the thesis makes the case for a journalism more 
attuned to the conflictual nature of 21st century political life. The case studies—
according to which the austerity debate was characterized by a strong degree 
of consensus—underline the importance of journalism open to varying 
politico-ideological projects that have come to the fore after the financial crisis. 
The thesis argues that by fostering ideological pluralism, journalism might be 
able to turn conflicts—inherent of all democratic life—into settings where 
political worldviews could clash while maintaining a certain level of mutual 
respect. While acknowledging the enormous challenges that journalism is 
faced with—economic, technological, or political—the thesis argues that such 
ideological pluralism might improve the public legitimacy of journalism and 
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writing and critical thinking. It has been a privilege to work with experienced 
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has been a great home. I thank my fellow dissertation-writers and friends, 
Sampsa Saikkonen, Salla-Maaria Laaksonen, Erna Bodström, Minttu Tikka, 
Kinga Polynczuk-Alenius, and Joonas Koivukoski, for the talks, reading 
circles, seminars, and collegial support. I also thank Leo Custódio (working at 
the University of Tampere at that time) for the get-togethers and discussions 
on sociological theory and Hannu Nieminen for the support and the decision 
to hire me as a research assistant for one of his projects many years ago. 
This thesis would have probably been somewhat different if it was not for 
the people at our research project “Between Law and Politics” that studies 
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Thank you, Timo Miettinen, Lauri Holappa (special shout-out for all the 
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thesis. 
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best person one can hope to fall for, and I am still grateful for the evening I 
met you.  
 
 












Abstract ....................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................... 6 
Contents ..................................................................................................... 8 
List of original publications...................................................................... 10 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 11 
2 Research problem and structure of the study ................................. 15 
3 Professional journalism and its challenges .................................... 20 
4 Democracy and journalism ............................................................. 26 
4.1 On the concept of democracy ................................................. 26 
4.2 The democratic roles of journalism ....................................... 28 
4.3 Analysing journalism’s democratic performance .................. 32 
5 Economic crisis, austerity and journalism ..................................... 34 
6 The case studies ............................................................................... 41 
6.1 Article 1: mediating the German ideology: ordoliberal framing 
in European press coverage of the eurozone crisis ............................. 41 
6.2 Article II: Established ideas from established institutions: 
austerity and structural reforms in the Finnish economic policy 
debate  ................................................................................................ 42 
6.3 Article III: Reason over politics: The Economist’s historical 
framing of austerity ............................................................................. 43 
6.4 Article IV: The Economist’s depoliticization of European 
austerity and the constitution of a ‘euphemized’ neoliberal 
discourse .............................................................................................. 43 
7 Data used in the thesis ..................................................................... 45 
8 Theoretical and methodological considerations ............................. 47 
8.1 The legitimation of austerity in the European public sphere 47 
8.2 The interplay between policy ideas and institutions in 
journalism ........................................................................................... 48 
 
9 
8.3 The historical framing of austerity ......................................... 49 
8.4 The depoliticization of austerity by economic journalism: A 
discourse theory perspective ...............................................................50 
9 Findings ........................................................................................... 52 
9.1 Limited alternatives to dominant narratives in the European 
austerity debate .................................................................................... 52 
9.2 Established institutions dominated the debate on austerity . 53 
9.3 Austerity as modernization and reason .................................. 54 
10 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 56 
11 Discussion ........................................................................................ 61 




LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
This thesis is based on the following publications: 
 
I Ojala, Markus & Harjuniemi, Timo (2016). Mediating the German 
ideology: Ordoliberal framing in European press coverage of the 
eurozone crisis. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 
24(3): 414–430.  
 
II Harjuniemi, Timo & Ampuja, Marko (2019). Established ideas 
from established institutions: austerity and structural reforms in 
the Finnish economic policy debate. Critical Policy Studies, 13(4): 
451–469.  
 
III Harjuniemi, Timo (2019). Reason over politics: The Economist’s 
historical framing of austerity. Journalism Studies, 20(6): 804–
822.  
 
IV Harjuniemi, Timo (2019). The Economist’s depoliticization of 
European austerity and the constitution of a ‘euphemised’ 
neoliberal discourse. Critical Discourse Studies, Epub ahead of 










Faced with struggles on multiple fronts, journalism is going through difficult 
times. Economically, the profession is challenged by the mushrooming of 
alternative content providers, enabled by innovations in communication 
technologies and the breakup of nationally regulated media ecologies. The vast 
number of popular choices means that publishers are no longer able to exploit 
the bottlenecks between audiences and information and turn these 
opportunities into newspapers subscriptions and ad sales. The stable 
professional culture with well-resourced newsrooms and job stability – 
characteristic of journalism’s “high modernist” (Hallin 1992) period from mid-
to-late 20th century – has therefore been making room for a more fragmented 
journalistic life and increasing precarization (Gollmitzer 2019).  
Politically, the situation is difficult as well. The public opinion towards 
journalism is suspicious. Popular attitudes on journalism are characterized by 
distrust (Newman et al. 2018).  Journalists are under attack by such hate-
mongers as Donald Trump, and the widespread anger at elites seems to 
include journalists as well (Zelizer 2018). Professional journalists are 
increasingly seen as stooges of a failing ruling class out of touch with ordinary 
people. It seems obvious that the political crisis challenging liberal Western 
societies is a crisis of professional journalism as well, a profession whose 
history has gone in tandem with the history of liberal thought (Nerone 1995; 
Ward 2011). 
These developments have implications for democratic public 
communication. Journalism still plays a vital role in orchestrating democratic 
debate. In complex mass societies where various aspects of life are played out 
in traditional and – increasingly – in digital media, journalism has an essential 
role in politics and public life. Journalism is a means of dealing with political 
differences and conflicts in a peaceful manner. Journalism works to articulate 
differing opinions in a shared public space. Journalism raises awareness of 
issues of common concern, and, as the public “watchdog”, alerts the public of 
elite wrongdoings and holds the powerful accountable. In short, journalism is 
a vital institution for a pluralist liberal society. 
It is not evident how journalism can fulfil its democratic functions in the 
current situation. The ability of journalism to function as a social arbiter and 
a common communicative architecture is being challenged by political 
polarization and shifts in public communications. Rising economic inequality 
in many Western societies has weakened social mobility and deepened the 
divide between the haves and the have-nots (Piketty 2017; Nachtwey 2018). 
The financial crisis and the austerity measures implemented after the near 
meltdown of the global economy worked to further disrupt the Post-World 
War II political dynamics (Tooze 2018). It is being argued that rising 
Introduction 
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polarization is undermining the social position of science, experts and 
journalists, the traditional truth-tellers of liberal Western societies (Waisbord 
2018). Therefore, one can argue that it is more difficult for journalism to be 
the “centring” (Muhlmann 2008) force that would work to serve a democratic 
public by uniting it under an umbrella of common values. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that increasing political polarization and the popular distrust 
towards established political institutions are deteriorating media trust as well 
(Hanitzsch et al. 2018). 
The authority of professional journalism is further undermined by the 
emergence of alternative news outlets and content providers, many of whom 
undercut any established norms of professional journalism. Media scholars 
argue that the fragmentation of mass-publics into digital silos – into which 
content is fed by opaque algorithms – means a crisis for the 20th century mass 
communication system, regulated by professional journalists and national 
regulatory authorities (Waisbord 2018b). The immense speed and affective 
intensity of digital public communications would seem to undermine joint 
efforts of democratic discourse, which often takes times and patience 
(Dahlgren 2018). Therefore, online public communications often resemble a 
battle zone where hateful actors organize to harass, for example, feminists, 
often for the sheer pleasure of transgression and trolling the liberal status quo 
(Nagle 2017; Seymour 2019). It is easy to notice how the utopias concerning 
the democratic and emancipatory potential of the internet and communication 
technologies have been making way for critical and even dystopian analyses. 
Instead of being “technologies of freedom” (Pool 1983), digital technologies 
offer “data capitalism” (Myers West 2019) and fine-grained means of 
surveillance and subordination (Morozov 2013; Couldry and Mejias 2019).  
It is argued that combined with the rise of populist politics, these shifts in 
public communications feed a chaotic system of “post-truth communication” 
(Waisbord 2018b), which renders any claim to truth as a politically biased 
endeavour. Media scholar Peter Dahlgren (2018) argues that post-truth 
signals a crisis of democracy and the emergence of a new epistemic regime, 
where emotional responses prevail over facts and reasoned analysis and where 
political tribalism overrides any attempt for public deliberation and 
consensus-seeking. No doubt, this thesis has faced criticism as well. Critics 
have noted how elite commentators and experts use the term “post-truth” to 
render populist political upheavals as dangerous deviations from the truthful 
order of things (Collins 2019). According to critics, post-truth works as a 
means of dismissing the political failures of liberal politics via shifting the 
focus on the irrationality of the mass publics, duped to populist politics by 
vicious outside agents fabricating viral social media content (Jutel 2019). 
However, the mere fact that our daily public discourse is filled with such 
buzzwords as “post-truth” or “fake news” signals a growing interest on the 
future of democratic public communication. We are in a situation 
characterized by a high demand for democratic debate and a cluelessness on 
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how to achieve it – despite the vast amount of different communication 
platforms.  
Amid the turbulence, such traditional forms of public communication as 
journalism find it increasingly difficult to hold on to their authoritative status. 
Still, journalism has, with all its problems, served as “an essential institution 
of democratic public spheres” (Dahlgren 2018, 25). Therefore, I argue in this 
thesis that journalists and journalism scholars must muster responses to the 
plethora of pressing concerns, although it is evident that there are no one-size-
fits-all fixes. No doubt, journalism scholarship has already addressed these 
issues. Media scholarship has recognized how media commercialization, the 
globalization of media systems and the breakdown of nationally regulated 
media spheres have paved the way for the alleged era of misinformation and 
populist figures (Pickard 2018; Waisbord 2018b). Further, scholarship has 
noted how the mainstream objective journalism finds it difficult to deal with 
such figures as Donald Trump with no respect of facts or truth (McNair 2017). 
Scholars have emphasized how journalists should not let autocratic-styled 
presidents dictate the news agenda but take a firm stance against anti-
democratic figures (Benson 2018; Karpf 2018). 
In a similar fashion, journalistic outlets have stressed the historical and 
well-founded argument that the free press plays a vital role in liberal 
democracies and that any attack on press freedom undermines the very 
premises of pluralist democratic societies.1 The growing interest in “data 
journalism” (Anderson 2018) is another attempt to improve journalism. The 
idea is that using large datasets and scientific means of analysing and 
presenting the data, journalism can speak truth to power and reclaim its 
trustworthy position as a public disseminator of information and analysis, a 
position envisaged already in the early 20th century by such thinkers as Walter 
Lippmann (1920).  
These are important undertakings. If we wish to maintain democratic 
public life, we need means of holding the powerful accountable as well as a 
space where we can have a shared view on the matter being debated. 
Journalism can provide us with these means. However, to save what is 
important in professional journalism for democracy, our analysis on 
journalisms woes must go deeper than the “well-worn” (Muhlmann 2010, 1) 
                                                
1 The fact that The Washington Post, in early 2017, reported that it has a new slogan – Democracy 
Dies in Darkness – is one sign of this. See The Washington Post 24.2.2017, “The Washington Post’s new 
slogan turns out to be an old saying” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-
washington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cda-fa02-
11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html.) Another example was the billboard campaign of the biggest 
Finnish daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat organized during the Helsinki summit between U.S. 
President Trump and his Russian counterpart in July 2018. Such slogans as “Mr. President, Welcome to 
the land of the free press” were written on the billboards on the presidents’ route from the Helsinki 




notions about the freedom of expression or the importance of watchdog 
journalism. I argue that it is necessary to analyse the nexus between 
journalism and democracy in a way that does not shy away from the fact that 
the relationship has always been ridden with contradictions. 
The aim of this article-based thesis and this synopsis chapter is to use the 
economic crisis and austerity measures as a prism through which to look at the 
relationship between journalism and democracy. I argue that there are good 
reasons for such a choice. The financial crisis of 2008–2009, the euro crisis 
that followed and the austerity measures (e.g. cuts in public spending) used to 
manage the crisis mark a watershed moment in liberal capitalist societies. 
They accelerated the erosion of established political forces and fuelled political 
fragmentation (Tooze 2018). Many of the premises of politics as usual – such 
as globalization, the free flow of goods and people as well as multilateral 
international governance – are being rethought and even undermined in the 
aftermath of the crisis. The resurgence of anti-establishment political ideas 
from both the left and the right signal a crisis of the post-World War II liberal 
political imaginary (Waisbord 2018). The crisis ended the seemingly non-
conflictual era of politics when the antagonism between the financial markets 
and national welfare states had allegedly been resolved and politico-
ideological conflicts largely replaced with wide-spread consensus on economic 
globalization (Mouffe 2018). I argue that the difficulties journalism and 
democratic public life are facing should not be thought of as separate 
phenomena. To understand the problems that journalism is facing and to 
revive journalism’s democratic functions, we need to analyse these 
developments simultaneously. 
  As the financial crisis delivered a blow for common sense notions on 
politics and the economy, a space opened for the articulation of alternative 
ideas and ideologies. Whether in the form of anti-immigrant right-wing 
populism or revised socialist or social democratic ideals, we are witnessing the 
return of political contestation. The crisis is therefore an intriguing moment to 
analyse the democratic performance of journalism and to map out some of the 
root causes of journalism’s current difficulties. The way in which journalism 
dealt with the crisis, I argue, shows how journalism often works to stave off 
criticism towards the prevailing order of things. And through analysing these 
dynamics, it is possible to sketch how journalism could, perhaps, develop new 








2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE STUDY 
This article-based thesis addresses the nexus between journalism, democracy 
and the economic crisis. It explores how European professional journalism 
addressed the policies of austerity – i.e. cuts in public spending and wages – 
that started to dominate the European policy response to the crisis in 2010 
(see Blyth 2015). This thesis, via four case studies and this synopsis chapter, 
evaluates how journalism succeeded in fulfilling the democratic functions 
often given to journalism by media theory. These functions include, for 
example, monitoring the decision-makers on behalf of the public, facilitating 
a pluralist debate on politics and providing the public with critical analyses on 
current affairs (McNair 2000; Schudson 2008; Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 
2015).  
On an empirical level, this thesis is an analysis on the journalistic coverage 
of austerity policies. The thesis is comprised of four empirical case studies and 
contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on austerity, the economic crisis 
and journalism (Tracy 2012; Mylonas 2014; Preston and Silke 2014; Doudaki 
2015; Berry 2016; Knowles et al. 2017; Basu 2018). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the results reiterate the well-established critique towards the problematic 
tendencies of professional journalism (see Hall et al. 1978; Hermann and 
Chomsky 1988; Philo et al. 1995). The empirical analyses illustrate how 
dominant national and transnational elites dominated the journalistic debate 
on European austerity policies in 2009–2014 and how journalism worked to 
legitimize austerity as the only response to the economic crisis.  
However, to move beyond mere journalism criticism – which is in danger 
of leading to destructive cynicism and the abandonment of professional 
journalism as inherently anti-democratic (see Muhlmann 2010) – the thesis 
contributes to the topical debate on the difficulties of professional journalism 
and democratic public communication. These concerns are manifested by a 
declining level of trust towards news and the acute concerns regarding the 
deteriorating conditions of the public sphere (Waisbord 2018b; Dahlgren 
2018). By building on the case studies and on the lessons from the journalistic 
coverage of the crisis and austerity, this thesis deliberates on the potential 
ways to address these concerns. How can professional journalism be 
developed to better deal with public and political life that often seems to be 
overtly antagonistic? 
This thesis will deliberate on the relationship between journalism and 
democracy with the help of four case studies that deal with the journalistic 
coverage of the European economic crisis and austerity policies (see Table 1). 
The four articles will approach the issue from different perspectives. Article I 
addresses the journalistic coverage of the euro crisis with a vast quantitative 
analysis, comprised of data collected from eight European countries. The 
Research problem and structure of the study 
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study analyses the dominant journalistic framing of the euro crisis between 
2010 and 2012. The study examines how European news media interpreted 
the euro crisis. What were the root causes of the crisis? And what should have 
been done to address the crisis and combat the economic predicament?  
Article II takes a different approach. With the EU and eurozone member 
state Finland as a case study, the study analyses how the turn to austerity 
policies in 2010 played out in the leading national Finnish daily newspaper 
Helsingin Sanomat (HS). The study shows how the long-term economic policy 
ideas nurtured by the dominant institutions of economic policymaking, 
namely the Finnish Ministry of Finance and the European Union, dominated 
the debate on Finnish economic policies between 2009 and 2014. The article 
argues that while a strong elite consensus on the course of economic policy 
prevails, it is difficult for journalism to provide the public with viewpoints that 
would substantially differ from dominant ideas. 
Article III adopts a historical approach to analyse how journalism has 
addressed the question of austerity. The study analyses the austerity debates 
of the influential business magazine The Economist between 1947 and 2012. 
The qualitative frame analysis illustrates how journalism has traditionally 
addressed austerity with an enduring frame that sees austerity as necessary in 
times of economic difficulties.  
Article IV adopts a discourse theoretical perspective and analyses The 
Economist newspaper’s coverage of European austerity measures in 2010–
2012. It contributes to the scholarly discussion on media, austerity and 
neoliberalism by illustrating how journalism constructs neoliberal discourses. 
The study finds that during the euro crisis, The Economist addressed austerity 
as necessary to modernize the European welfare states to meet the demanding 
conditions of the global economy. Accordingly, anti-austerity sentiments were 
often deemed as populist or selfish, stemming from the need to serve vested 
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the articulatory logics of 
neoliberal discourse. 
Discourse theoretical 






The article analyses how The 
Economist newspaper 
constructed a “euphemized” 
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The structure of this synopsis chapter is as follows. I will start by discussing 
the main concepts of this thesis – journalism and democracy – and how these 
two concepts are interwoven. I will discuss the concept of “professional 
journalism” and provide the reader with a history of the professionalization of 
journalism. I argue that it is important to understand how journalism 
professionalized into its contemporary form if we are to understand the 
difficulties that it is facing in the 21st century. I will also discuss the various 
democratic roles that journalism in given by scholars. The liberal, deliberative 
and agonistic perspectives work as tools with which to address the democratic 
performance of journalism during the crisis and the period of austerity. 
I will also briefly discuss the criticism towards professional journalism:  the 
journalistic movements that have challenged standardized notions about 
professional journalism, as well as the critical strand of media and journalism 
studies. These lines of thought have both emphasized the role of professional 
journalism in structuring and disseminating elite ideas. Critics have argued 
that instead of fostering a pluralist debate and empowering democratic 
demands, professional journalism – due to increasing pressure from market 
forces and institutionalized professional practices – works to shield the status 
quo. I will also situate the study in its context, the euro crisis, and discuss the 
relationship between journalism and economic crises. 
After presenting the findings of the four case studies, the thesis concludes 
by discussing the future political and democratic roles of journalism. In this 
concluding chapter, I will build on the results of my empirical case analyses 
and sketch ideas for improving democratic journalism. I will return to 
democratic theory and deliberate on how to develop journalism in turbulent 
times. Especially, I will build upon the political theorist Chantal Mouffe 
according to whom democratic public debate is characterized by the presence 
of competing ideological world views (Mouffe 1989; 2013). I argue that the 
journalistic coverage of austerity (which was characterized by a strong degree 
of consensus) makes the case for a more pluralist and ideologically diverse 
journalism. I will deliberate as to whether these insights could provide us with 
means of developing journalism to be better equipped in dealing a with a 
highly politicized 21st century public life. 
My aim is to build upon democratic theory and the radical critique (Laclau 
and Mouffe 2014) of liberal democratic theory to develop ideas that could 
possibly help journalism to foster a pluralist debate between different political 
ideas and ideological worldviews. Although liberal democratic thought and 
professional journalism subscribe to the values of pluralism, they are often 
characterized by striving for a consensus that is in danger of stifling 
democratic debate (Mouffe 2009; Fenton 2016; Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 
2017; Karppinen 2018). In analysing the current difficulties of public 
communications and journalism, I argue that Mouffe’s (2013) distinction 
between “antagonism” and “agonism” could be helpful. I will deliberate 
whether journalism could help in taming political passions and antagonisms 
– which are inherent of all social life and should not be eliminated – into 
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agonistic settings where differing ideological worldviews could clash while 
maintaining a mutual respect towards the democratic ideals of equality and 
freedom. 
To bring these ideas closer to journalism practice, I will use Géraldine 
Muhlmann’s (2008; 2010) distinction between “unifying” and “decentring” 
journalisms. Muhlmann argues that historically, journalism has been divided 
between these two professional poles. The “unifying” journalist has sought to 
unify the public around a “we” that can share a consensus on a set of facts or 
values. The “decentring” journalist, on the contrary, has sought to make visible 
the inherently conflictual nature of the social world. I make the argument that 
the current political conjuncture calls for professional journalism that can de-
centre the world. As it is getting increasingly difficult to reach a like-minded 
public, journalism that is overtly committed to unifying the public might, 
paradoxically, work to further stir up political antagonisms by delegitimizing 
some segments of the population. However, by working to de-centre the social 
world (i.e. shedding light on various conflicts and giving voice to various 
politico-ideological demands) journalism might be able to build connections 
between different political groups and help to foster agonistic public debates. 
One should be aware that such theoretical choices have normative and 
political repercussions. Indeed, as Kari Karppinen (2019, 20), argues, 
“[m]edia and communication research is never far removed from political and 
normative questions“. When scholars use concepts such as democracy, 
freedom and pluralism, they make normative assumptions about the role 
media and communication systems should play in public life. Still, it is useful 
to be aware of the limitations of one’s theoretical and conceptual choices. It is 
important to highlight that the democratic theory championed by Mouffe is 
rooted in a post-Marxist critique of liberalism and liberal democratic theory 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2014). In journalism studies, this position has certain 
implications. Using Mouffe’s ideas to analyse journalism tends to produce 
research settings and interpretations that critically highlight the ideological 
and political limits of professional journalism (see Phelan 2014). Should one 
look at austerity and journalism through another conceptual lens or 
democratic traditions, the results of the analysis, no doubt, would be 
somewhat different. In chapter 11, I further reflect on agonistic democratic 
theory and its relationship with deliberative democratic theory, a strand of 
democratic thought that stresses that the ideal of a rational consensus should 
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3 PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
What does one talk about when one talks about professional journalism? In 
this work, I define professional journalism as a professional practice of 
collecting, processing and circulating information and commentary. 
Journalism presents reports, analyses and critiques about affairs of public 
significance (Nerone 1995, 157; Schudson 2008, 10–11). Journalism is a 
practice conducted by professional journalists, typically organized in 
hierarchical newsrooms and devoted to professional norms and guidelines 
(Waisbord 2013; Kantola 2016). To be more precise, I talk about professional 
Western “hegemonic” (Nerone 2015) journalism, which puts heavy emphasis 
on such professional values as objectivity (Zelizer 2004; Deuze 2005). 
Although these ideals are widespread especially in the US and Western 
Europe, it should be stated that these values are not universal. In non-Western 
countries, journalism can, for example, have a developmental role that sees 
journalism not as the liberal-democratic watchdog but as an institution that 
works in tandem with other institutions to achieve common societal goals 
(Christians et al. 2009, 200–211). 
Journalism, as a well-established professional practice, is a rather young 
institution, dating to the beginning of the 20th century (Schudson 1978; Kaplan 
2002). The history of the press and newspapers, however, is much older. As 
one deals with the question of journalism and democracy, it is useful to explore 
how the press got entangled with politics. Press historians argue that the roots 
of modern newspapers lie in the weekly news sheets of the late 16th century 
Venice and that printed newspapers first appeared in Europe at the beginning 
of the 17th century (Allan 2004, 10; Barnhurst and Nerone 2008, 18). These 
early newspapers aimed to serve needs of specific readers, such as business 
proprietors, and it was not until the 18th century when it became commonplace 
for newspapers to reach out to a wider audience. The foundations of modern 
political journalism lie in the bourgeois revolutions of England, France and 
America that sought to dislodge the absolute rule of the monarchy and which 
gradually lead to a widening of the democratic franchise (Barnhurst and 
Nerone 2008, 18; McNair 2008, 238). 
The bourgeois upheavals transformed the press. The press was thrown into 
the turmoil of political struggles, and they became instruments of political 
argumentation. Newspapers were essential for the newly-born “bourgeois 
public sphere” (Habermas 1989) – a space between state and the domestic 
space where the strengthening bourgeoisie could deliberate on issues of 
common concern. Thus, the history of journalism often reads as a history of 
empowerment and liberation. Journalism history stresses how publicists, 
philosophers and journalists fought against state censorship, regulation and 
controls and for free speech and a free press (McNair 2008; Ward 2011). 
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By the 19th century, journalism and politics had enmeshed, as newspapers 
had become a space for argumentation. Both in Britain and in the US, the 
1800s witnessed the rise of popular journalism aimed at wide working-class 
readership (Curran 1978; Schudson 1978; Conboy 2004). Fuelled by 
industrialization, urbanization and the growing democratic franchise, many of 
these popular newspapers were campaigning for social change and fostering a 
sense of partisan togetherness. However, the popular newspapers of the 19th 
century did lay the foundations for a more objective and politically neutral 
strand of journalism. This gradual process of “professionalization” saw 
journalists abandoning the partisan ties of journalism and adopting a more 
neutral style of reporting. 
Journalism scholarship argues that reasons behind professionalization 
were partly economic. The development of the democratic market society and 
consumer capitalism in the 19th century created a market for popular 
newspapers. Newspapers started to serve the mass audiences of growing urban 
areas with fact-based reporting instead of partisan opinions. This is the case 
especially with the US, were the affordable “penny press” is seen as a crucial 
phase in the development of objective journalism (Schudson 1978).2 Likewise, 
the radical British press gradually declined in the face of journalism more 
attuned to the political preferences of the growing middle-class. As journalism 
was gradually liberated from state control and became more independent from 
political forces, it grew dependent on market funding. This led journalism to 
steer clear from political radicalism and adopt a more moderate political 
stance that would make journalism accessible to an audience as wide as 
possible (Conboy 2004). 
The emergence of professional journalism was therefore partly due to the 
increasing commodification of news. The birth of professional norms and the 
journalistic style of writing worked to make the production of news more 
efficient (Chalaby 1998; Waisbord 2013, 26). As journalism had economic 
interests to serve, the idea of journalism as the independent “watchdog” or 
“fourth estate” – which would monitor the powerful on behalf of the people – 
worked to legitimatize journalism in the eyes of the public (Boyce 1978; 
Conboy 2004; Waisbord 2013, 98). 
Professionalization worked to enhance the prestige of journalism. Large 
segments of the public held a negative view about journalism, due to 
sensationalism and overt partisanship – both characteristic of 19th century 
popular press. Towards the end of the 19th century, efforts to improve the social 
status of journalism gained foothold as the first press clubs and unions were 
established to foster a sense of professionalism (Waisbord 2013, 22–25). In 
societies going through large-scale transformations, such as rapid 
urbanization and modernization, many professions organized and mobilized 
                                                
2 It should be noted that this is a somewhat controversial storyline. Nerone (1987) has argued that 
the popular “mythology” paints a somewhat misleading picture of the penny press, as, for example, 
political partisanism was present in the penny papers.    
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to strengthen professional autonomy and harvest social respect. Journalism 
was no exception. Journalists started to define a public service mission for 
themselves: to serve the people and democracy. This required independence 
not only from partisan goals and the state but from vested economic interests 
as well. A new shared set of professional ethics and norms was meant to raise 
journalists into an autonomous position and shield them from the corroding 
effects of both politics and the market (Kaplan 2002; Hallin 2008). 
The aspiration to reach the status of professional independence emerged in 
an intellectual climate in which criticisms were hurled towards democracy, 
politics and the press. Especially in the US, the reach for professional 
autonomy was affected by the early 20th century Progressive critique of 
political parties and ideology (Schudson 1978, 158–159; Waisbord 2013, 28). 
The overtly tribal and corrupted nature of mass party politics was in danger of 
undercutting the very principles of democratic market societies. Instead of 
partisan politics, the answer to societal woes would lie in a more scientific 
model of administration and a more elitist form of democracy (Schudson 1978, 
158–159, Waisbord 2013, 28). Progressive reformers believed that societal 
problems and class conflicts could be managed by impassionate professionals 
and technical expertise (Kaplan 2010, 34). These ideas are reflected in 
professional journalistic values of public interest and objectivity. The 
journalist would have to stand between “politicians and the public to 
guarantee that the populace would not be manipulated by the politician’s 
cynical words” (Kaplan 2002, 141). 
The consolidation of professional journalism during early 20th century 
intertwines with wide-spread disillusionment with idea of the “marketplace of 
ideas”. In the marketplace of ideas, rational individuals would, as classical 
liberal thought had it, choose from competing arguments, and the outcome of 
this process would promote the common good (Nerone 1995, 43). However, 
multiple developments made it clear that the marketplace of ideas was too 
dangerous a place to be left to work without regulation and professional 
oversight. The challenge that both socialism and fascism presented to liberal 
market societies during the first decades of the 20th century sparked fears that 
a mob rule might replace the reasonable public (Schudson 1978). The 
commercial newspapers of the time were deemed as feeding the stereotypes 
and prejudices of people instead of being a space for rational and critical 
debate (Nerone 2015, 320). 
These concerns were fuelled by various factors. The efficiency of 
propaganda used in World War I led to the realization that mass media carried 
tremendous manipulative potential. The rise of the public relations industry 
made it clear that the public sphere was increasingly used for cynical 
manipulation and profit-seeking (Schudson 1978). Overall, the mood of the 
times was marked by a growing criticism towards democratic ideals. It was 
unreasonable to think that the public would consist of “omnicompetent” 
(Lippmann [1927] 1993, 29) citizens that would have the time or resources to 
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form enlightened opinions on the different aspects of an industrial mass 
society characterized by ever-increasing complexity. 
The professionalization of journalism was a response to these concerns. 
The 20th century journalists became information professionals who would 
manage the public debate on current affairs and verify the value and accuracy 
of utterances before they reached the mass public (Nerone 1995, 51–52; 
Kaplan 2010; 34–35). Journalism adopted the norm of “social responsibility” 
that would curb the excesses of market based public communication 
(Barnhurst and Nerone 2008, 22; McQuail 1992, 37–48). In this compromise, 
journalists got the status of autonomous professionals. Owners agreed to let 
the new norms of professionalism override profit-maximizing to stave off 
public criticism towards media power and avoid drastic means of state 
regulation (Nerone 2012, 450). 
During the 20th century, the ideal of a socially responsible press committed 
to the public interest was enforced by media policy on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The Hutchins Commission in the US in 1947 and the Royal 
Commission on the Press in the UK in 1949 argued that the press should 
provide a “truthful” and “intelligent” account of current affairs and “instruct 
the public on the main issues of the day” (McQuail 1992, 37–41). Moreover, 
public service broadcasting – which has, especially in Europe, played a major 
part in the distribution of news to mass audiences – was given birth by the 
realization that governments need to regulate the media (e.g. Mills 2016). 
Gradually, these features came to characterize Western journalism during 
the 20th century. Without a doubt, there are differences between Western 
media systems and journalistic cultures (Hallin and Mancini 2004), but these 
should be considered as variations, not as radical deviations, from the Anglo-
American style of journalism that has strived for professional autonomy from 
politics and the market. Indeed, journalists over the Western world still 
subscribe to the rather traditional values characteristic of Anglo-American 
hegemonic journalism (Hanitzsch 2011; Pöyhtäri et al. 2016; Riedl 2018; Vos 
and Wolfgang 2018), and no alternative dominant paradigm has come to 
replace this ideal type. 
This is not to say that the standard values of professional Western 
journalism would have gone unchallenged or unchanged. On the contrary, 
journalism history shows how journalist and journalism scholars have 
questioned and criticized some of basic tenets of professional journalism. For 
example, the “public” and “citizen” journalism movements have challenged 
the “fortress” (Nordenstreng 1995, 118) of professional journalism, which, 
according to the critics, is deeply interwoven with  power centres of societies 
and neglectful of the civil society and activist organizations (see Rosen 2000; 
Hanitzsch 2007; Christians et al. 2009, 186–190). 
It is important to note that the standard characterization of professional 
journalism by no means covers the entire field of journalism. Core journalistic 
values, such as the idea that the journalists can produce “objective” 
representations about the world, have been in a constant state of flux since the 
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advent of professional journalism. Scholars as well as journalists have been 
critical and sceptical towards these ideals (Tuchman 1978; Schudson 1978). 
The “new journalism” movement gave birth to a more adversarial type of 
reporting amid the political upheavals and the adversarial culture of the 1960s 
and 1970s (Schudson 1978, 187–188; Wien 2005; Muhlmann 2010, 189–190).  
It was critical of the neutral posture of what was considered appropriate 
professional journalism. New journalism was critical towards professional 
values of objectivity and neutrality, which were serving the authoritative social 
elites and conservative values. Moreover, as the stable professional identity of 
the mid-20th century journalist has gradually declined and made way for 
journalism more attuned to the flexible nature of contemporary societies, 
journalists have become increasingly sceptical towards the values and 
structures of high-modernist journalism and developed a mindset critical of 
established sources of authority (Kantola 2012). 
However, despite these changes and the obvious diversification of 
journalism, the core values of professional journalism are still very much in 
the heart of the professional identity and ideology of journalists (Deuze 2005). 
Western journalists subscribe to classic professional values and make use of 
them in their daily work. Indeed, there seems to be something enduring about 
the hegemonic form of journalism. The idea of “professional Western 
journalism” is reminiscent of a Weberian “ideal type” (Weber 1949, 90), an 
idealized characterization that captures the key elements of unique historical 
configurations and phenomena, in this case journalism. Therefore, the ideal 
type of professional journalism should not be seen a means of capturing the 
whole range and multiplicity of what journalism is, but as a tool to dissect 
some of “the essential characteristics” (Calhoun et al. 2012, 270) of 
professional journalism. These characteristics still seem to play a major role in 
the profession. The idea about professional journalism is therefore a 
construction necessary for the analysis of the societal and democratic 
significance of journalism. 
It is equally important to note that the ideal typical and hegemonic form of 
Western journalism was given birth by a certain historical conjuncture. The 
political, economic and technological cornerstones of this conjuncture have 
not remained unchanged. Politically, the challenges faced by the post-World 
War II social democratic consensus have fragmented the mass public (Hallin 
2006). Technologically, the 20th century media system was supported by 
information scarcity and a lack of popular alternatives to newspapers and 
broadcasting. Therefore, during its golden age, it was easier for journalism to 
bridge the gap between the public service mission and market demands. 
Journalism was a lucrative business opportunity as well as a critical watchdog 
with public service functions (Curran 2007).  
The early 20th-century media landscape, to a large extent, was regulated 
within nation states. However, globalization, fuelled by technological advances 
and the increasingly international nature of production chains, also affected 
the media landscape (Nerone 1995, 159–176). In the 1980s, advances in 
 
25 
satellite and cable technologies started to challenge the environment of 
information scarcity (Christians et al. 2009, 15). Confined national audiences 
made room for fragmenting groups of media consumers with divergent, global 
media diets. Meanwhile, the commodification of media and journalism 
accelerated amid global competition. Finally, the Internet smashed the 
gatekeeper position of journalism and plunged its business model into 
difficulties as the public was presented with endless alternatives to 
professional journalism. In a situation characterised by increasing 
competition, it has become difficult to subscribe to the democratic mission of 
socially responsible professional journalism while maintaining a highly 
profitable business. This tension is reflected in well-established concerns over 
the future of critical journalism in difficult economic environments 
(McChesney 2003; Schudson 2005; Christians et al. 2009, 225–225). 
These tendencies have been fuelled by media policy approaches that have 
emphasized deregulation in the name of competition and innovation. This has 
meant an end to the nationally regulated media landscape (Christians et al. 
2009, 15). Of course, it is reasonable to argue that a plurality of channels and 
options creates a more diverse political public sphere where rulers and elites 
are being forced under intense public scrutiny (McNair 2000). It is, however, 
evident that media policy has failed to curb the power of the media and tech 
companies – largely in charge of our daily media use (Freedman 2018). This 
has had eroding effects on the political public sphere. It has helped to build a 
media system that, in its fervour desire for clicks and views, favours populist 
styles of political communication (Jutel 2019b; Moffitt 2019). One extreme 
example was the US cable channels for whom the spectacle of the Donald 
Trump campaign proved to be an economic boost (Picard 2018). 
Indeed, these developments have raised pressing questions about the 
relationship between journalism and democracy. How does journalism fulfil 
its democratic roles amid a market squeeze and in a media environment laden 
with options and content creators, many of whom circumvent any notions of 
journalistic professionalism? Rising political antagonisms and grievances 
have eroded public trust not only on politicians and experts but on journalists 
as well (Davies 2018).  The populist revolt and distrust of traditional forms of 
truth-telling together with an abundance of online content are, allegedly, 
adding up to an era of “post-truth”, an epistemic crisis that is in danger of 
eroding any base of shared reality and democratic discourse (Dahlgren 2018). 
Thus, it is increasingly important to analyse the democratic and political role 
that journalism can and should have. 
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4 DEMOCRACY AND JOURNALISM 
The idea that journalism plays an essential role in a well-functioning 
democracy has been central for both journalism and journalism history for 
centuries (Zelizer 2012). The notion that journalism serves democratic 
governance dates to the 17th and 18h centuries and to the revolutionary 
struggles between monarchies and early forms of parliamentarianism (McNair 
2008, 238). As the democratic franchise gradually gained foothold, the public 
sphere became a place for deliberation and argumentation on political issues 
(Habermas 1989). Early journalism started to liberate itself from state control 
and became a means of publicly articulating differentiating demands about the 
future of a democratic society. 
Ever since the late 19th century and with the emergence of professional 
journalism, journalism has seen itself as a guardian of democracy (Waisbord 
2013, 43). Journalism is central in facilitating public opinion and making 
democratic governance, based on popular consent, possible. A democracy is 
dependent on a well-informed citizenship, and it is up to journalism to provide 
the people with accurate and reliable information based on which to make 
informed political decisions (McNair 2008, 238). Ideally, journalism should 
provide the public with relevant and diverse information (Nielsen 2017). 
Moreover, journalism is often trusted with the critical “watchdog” or “fourth 
estate” role of monitoring the political decision-makers and signalling the 
public about elite wrongdoings (Conboy 2004; Schudson 2008; Hampton 
2010). However, to understand the multiple democratic roles that journalism 
is given, it is useful to go through some aspects of the very notion of 
democracy. 
4.1 ON THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY 
Democracy refers to the idea that “all power in society is rooted in the people 
and that government is accountable to the people” (Trappel 2011, 14). What 
this means in practice, is a question of vast theoretical discussions and political 
debates (e.g. Christians el al. 2009). For example, to what extent should 
powerful technocratic institutions elemental to governing advanced capitalist 
societies – such as central banks – be opened to democratic demands and 
public deliberation? Or to what extent should elements of democratic 
decision-making be applied to the governance and everyday functions of such 
institutions as schools or workplaces? Is democracy merely a means of electing 
the governing elites? Is it unrealistic to assume that most people in democratic 
societies would have the resources or the interest to participate in policy 
debates that often require detailed expert knowledge? 
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How should we examine the democratic functions of journalism? Should 
the democratic role of journalism be to alert the public about the possible 
wrongdoings of elites and democratically elected decision-makers and ensure 
that our institutions are run by responsible people? Should journalism drive 
social change or remain detached from political struggles? Should journalists 
aim to facilitate debates about the details of, for example, monetary policy and 
question the very idea that certain aspects of social life are too difficult and 
complex to be subjected to democratic debates? Should journalism committed 
to democratic values foster political conflicts or seek to build a consensus? 
Bearing these questions in mind, it is hardly surprising that democracy as 
well as the role of journalism in democratic societies have been conceptualized 
from various perspectives (e.g. Strömbäck 2005; Christians et al. 2009). 
However, for the purposes of this thesis and to understand the various 
democratic roles that professional journalism is often given in contemporary 
societies, it is enough to compare the liberal-elitist model, the deliberative 
model and the agonistic model of democracy (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 
2015). 
The liberal or liberal-elitist model of democracy stresses that political 
decisions are made by competent and well-informed elites who are elected by 
the people (Trappel 2011, 16). Most people do not have the necessary expertise 
or interest to participate in managing public affairs and, therefore, people need 
to elect competent elites to address popular concerns in such democratic 
bodies as the parliament. In the liberal model, society is thought of as 
consisting of competing groups and interests, while power is fragmented and 
diffused. The part and parcel of democratic decision-making, taking place 
primarily through elections, is to decide the leaders, rules and policies that 
correspond with the most widely held preferences (Trappel 2011, 16; 
Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 1044). While it is acknowledged that 
different groups pursue their own sectional interests, the political system 
works for the whole of the society (Hardy 2014, 39). Parliaments and 
governments – whose composition accurately reflects the heterogeneity of 
contemporary societies – can solve disputes and build consensuses 
(Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 1044). 
The deliberative democracy model is critical of the elitist emphasis of the 
liberal model. Those advocating for the deliberative model stress that any 
consensus should arise from a critical and pluralist deliberation among the 
people. Citizens should participate in disputes and critical debates over 
common problems. This facilitates a reasoned public opinion that can guide 
decision-makers in reaching a consensus (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 
1045). This line of thought owes to Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) famous 
conceptualization on the “public sphere” as a space for an open, rational and 
critical deliberation on common issues. Habermas argued that a public sphere 
gradually emerged in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries as monarchical 
power started to make room for capitalist market relations and the rising 
bourgeoisie class. It was in these settings where the bourgeoisie started to 
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debate and deliberate on issues of common concern in coffee houses, clubs and 
via early forms of the press. Through reasoned and open argumentation, these 
debates led to the formation of a public opinion. The deliberative model of 
democracy stresses that political decisions should stem from discussions that 
are committed to such values as rationality, impartiality and equality among 
the participants (Strömbäck 2005, 336). In an ideal situation, deliberative 
discussions should be part and parcel of daily life and take place not only in 
the media or the parliament but in ordinary life as well (ibid., 336). 
The agonistic model is critical of the consensual undertones present both 
in the liberal-elitist and deliberative forms of democracy (Mouffe 2009; 2013). 
The agonistic perspective is rooted in radical democratic theory. Radical 
democracy, as envisaged by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2014), 
stresses that not consensus but the multiplicity of conflicts that exists in 
societies is the essence of democratic politics. A radical democratic political 
project therefore consists of linking together different democratic struggles – 
whether they are, for example, feminist, anti-capitalist or anti-racist – to form 
alliances that can challenge oppression (Fenton 2016).   
Indeed, proponents of the agonistic model state that the search for 
consensus signals a failure to see the ultimately antagonistic character of any 
democratic society (Karppinen 2007; Mouffe 2009). Conflicts and political 
differences that cannot be bridged are inherent to all social life. The 
proponents of the agonistic model state that every consensus exists as a 
“stabilization of power” (Mouffe 1989, 756) that temporarily renders certain 
ideas as objective viewpoints that seem to represent the common good.  As the 
formation of any consensus always includes acts of exclusion (Raeijmaekers 
and Maeseele 2015, 1046), seeking consensuses is not only in vain but 
ultimately even dangerous. Proponents of this view argue that democratic 
debates should be debates between “adversaries” who differ radically on 
politics but share an “adhesion to ethico-political principles of democracy” 
(Mouffe 1989, 755). Should the political system be deprived of different 
democratic identities with which to identify, the confrontations are in risk of 
turning into battles “over essentialist identities and non-negotiable moral 
values” (ibid., 756). Thus, democratic contestations become struggles between 
“enemies” who seek to destroy each other (Mouffe 2009). Therefore, the goal 
of democratic politics should not be consensus but, on the contrary, the 
fostering of political differences and ideological cleavages. This is needed in 
order to tame “antagonisms” into “agonisms” which – despite their conflictual 
and unbridgeable character – are characterized by a devotion to democratic 
principles of “liberty and equality for all” (Mouffe 2013, 7). 
4.2 THE DEMOCRATIC ROLES OF JOURNALISM 
With the help of this brief look on different conceptualizations of democracy, 
one can start to discern the different democratic roles that journalism is often 
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given. The democratic role ascribed to journalism is a mixture of different 
norms and ideals.  One can identify traces of different democratic models from 
the practice of professional journalism. 
Journalism is often given a monitorial and a representative role in 
democratic societies. This role entails various elements. Monitorial journalism 
is to work as the public “watchdog” who monitors the exercise of power and 
signals the public if decision-makers or the powerful are behaving dishonestly 
(Curran 2007; McNair 2008, 17). Moreover, journalism represents the 
divergent views and concerns that the people have and works as a mediator 
between the public and governing elites. Journalism provides the “flow of 
information” (Strömbäck 2005, 332) between the government and the people. 
The people are provided with accurate information and analyses about issues 
of public significance to help them make informed decisions and sound 
political choices (Schudson 2008, 12). At the same time, the government is 
made aware of any public concerns or disputes so they can then be dealt with 
by political institutions (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 1045). Here, 
journalism aligns closely with the liberal-elitist tradition of democratic 
thought.  
Indeed, journalism has a crucial role to play in a liberal democracy in which 
elites elected by the people are trusted with vast decision-making powers 
(Christians et al. 2009, 145). It is therefore vital that journalism detaches itself 
from vested interests to provide the public with diverse and unbiased 
information. To function as the independent and diverse marketplace of ideas, 
journalism should be organized by market forces. Liberal media theory sees a 
media system independent of government control and organized by 
competitive markets as vital to a critical public sphere that can hold the 
government and political rulers accountable (McNair 2000, Curran 2002).  
More in line with deliberative tradition of democratic theory, journalism is 
also given a facilitative role (Trappel 2001, 20; Christians et al. 2009, 158–
179). Instead of being merely the transmission belt between the public and 
various institutions, journalism should facilitate and promote active 
citizenship and participation in public life. Journalism should foster civic 
action and not only transmit expert and elite thought to a passive public. 
Journalism is thus an essential part of the public sphere where consensus is 
constructed via a rational and critical debate. In addition to informing the 
public or alerting the government about pressing societal issues or concerns, 
journalism “helps to develop a shared moral framework for community and 
society” (Christians et al. 2009, 126). In short, journalism should help to 
improve the quality of public life. 
Deliberative theorists are often sceptical of market-oriented media 
(Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 1046). It is thought that media that works 
to serve market interests undermines the conditions of critical and pluralist 
media. It privileges cheap “sensationalism” (McQuail 1992, 310) over reasoned 
political content and fails to critically scrutinize corporate power. Thus, 
market-based journalism needs to be accompanied with public-service 
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journalism and media policies that support journalism independent of market 
forces. 
Third, journalism is also given a radical role in democratic societies. This 
entails not only the role of the critical watchdog devoted to raising 
consciousness on elite wrongdoings or pressing issues. In the radical role, 
journalist can also be a change agent devoted to challenging dominant political 
forces (Christians et al. 2009, 179), claiming a position often somewhat alien 
to the politically detached professional journalist. Those who see that 
journalism should play a more radical societal role often criticize such 
fundamental virtues of professional journalism as objectivity. It is claimed that 
they work to reinforce a static understanding of society where the boundaries 
of political and ideological pluralism are set by mainstream political players 
and experts (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017). Although professional 
journalism is devoted to the idea of reflecting a large variety of differing 
opinions, it essentially offers ideological plurality within certain ideological 
limits (Karppinen 2018), as views and opinions that go against the status quo 
are deemed as out of bounds. Therefore, journalism should foster ideological 
contestation (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015, 1046–1047). 
It is safe to say that journalism is a mixture of these democratic functions. 
It is not an easy task to draw clear-cut boundaries between different 
democratic roles. When does, for example, critical monitorial journalism turn 
into radical journalism that has a social agenda (Trappel 2001, 20)? Moreover, 
national and regional differences in journalistic and political cultures need to 
be considered while dissecting the democratic roles of journalism. Although 
professional journalism is an “Anglo-American invention” (Chalaby 1996) that 
has gradually become the hegemonic form of journalism in the Western world, 
there are differences in journalistic cultures within the West. The media 
systems in the UK and especially in the US are built on the idea that a market-
based media system will ensure freedom of the press and a pluralist 
journalistic field, while in continental Europe, the state – via public service 
broadcasting and media subsidies, for example – has been seen as crucial in 
fostering a critical-pluralist public sphere (Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
Moreover, journalists and political parties are traditionally more closely 
aligned in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe or in the US, meaning 
that there are differences in how detached journalists consider themselves to 
be from partisan and ideological struggles (ibid.). 
There are, however, unifying values as well. Many Western journalists 
subscribe to the idea that journalist is the “detached watchdog” (Hanitzsch 
2011, 485) of a democratic society. This ideal largely coincides with liberal 
notions on democracy. Many journalists see that they should provide citizens 
with information needed to make political decisions and keep an eye on the 
political and economic elites (Pöyhtäri et al. 2016, Riedl 2018). Here, 
journalists see themselves more as transmitters of accurate information and 
public watchdogs than as radical change agents or facilitators of civic 
participation. At the same time, however, it is evident that since the heyday of 
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the high-modernist period, journalism has become more opinionated, 
adversarial and critical towards established sources of expertise and authority 
(Hallin 2006; Baym 2009; Kantola 2012). Indeed, the democratic function of 
journalism is by no means a clear-cut matter. 
Significant criticism has been presented against these grand claims about 
journalism’s democratic role. It is argued that normative assumptions about 
journalism’s democratic functions are simply too out of touch with newsroom 
realities. Thus, we should tone down our expectations. It is not realistic to 
assume that journalism, operating in a digitalizing and fragmenting media 
ecology and under diminishing economic resources and strict deadlines, could 
play the heroic role often envisaged by journalism scholarship. Therefore, we 
should be satisfied if journalism provides “people with relatively accurate, 
accessible, diverse, relevant and timely independently produced information 
about public affairs” (Nielsen 2017, 1252). Moreover, scholars might resort to 
similar idealizations when it comes to the very idea of democracy. The public 
is easily valorised as virtuous community driven by a desire to democratic 
participation and deliberation. It is easy to overlook the fact that often, the 
public, busy with daily life and personal issues, might volunteer to take a more 
passive political role than envisaged by scholars enthusiastic about a 
democratically active people (see Lippmann 1993 [1927]). 
Taking this into account, it is no surprise that the critical scholarship often 
points out how the public is being held “hostage” (Muhlmann 2010, 12) by 
wicked journalists in the service of the powerful. Journalists deprive the 
people of a pluralist public sphere and fail to serve their democratic needs. 
Critical journalism scholarship has a long history in illustrating how 
professional journalism – despite claims for autonomy and the declaration of 
democratic ideals – serves the needs of a powerful few and stifles democratic 
debate. Media logics – characterized by a moderate political stance calibrated 
to speak to a mass consumer audience – work to render journalism hostile 
towards ideas that are too radical or too out of touch with the parameters of 
dominant opinion (Curran 1978; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Conboy 2004). 
Critical political economy scholars emphasize that the media market is, like 
any industry, geared towards profit maximization. This is an imperative that 
is in danger of overriding any democratic values (Hardy 2014). The cutbacks 
in newsrooms and commercialization of journalistic culture, in the face of 
increasing competition and technological innovations, have accelerated these 
anti-democratic tendencies, as journalistic values are under market attacks 
(McChesney 2003). Moreover, the values and practices of professional 
journalism, such as dependency on elite sources, work to legitimize certain 
political positions as authoritative and marginalize others (Tuchman 1978; 
Hallin 1984). The boundaries of journalistic debate are constructed by the 
“primary definers” (Hall et al. 1978, 57), people who allegedly possess the 
greatest authority on the issue. In economic policy debates, for example, this 
refers to political and administrative elites, economists, market analysts and 
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financiers (Chakravartty and Schiller, 2010; Harjuniemi et al. 2015; Basu 
2018). 
4.3 ANALYSING JOURNALISM’S DEMOCRATIC 
PERFORMANCE 
As it has become commonplace to deem journalism an essential part of 
Western democracies, it is hardly surprising that these assumptions have 
come to dominate journalism scholarship as well (Zelizer 2012). While 
journalism is essential in supporting the foundations of democracy, 
journalism scholarship is needed to assess whether journalists fulfil their 
democratic obligations. But how can we examine whether journalism does 
this? 
First, the emergence of bias in political communication is considered a 
problem (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017, 653). It is argued that the balance 
norm of journalism requires journalism to present the perspectives of both 
sides in disputes (Entman 1989, 30). This necessitates a lack of bias. A political 
initiative from a left-wing party or a labour union to raise government 
spending, for example, should be handled in a balanced fashion, meaning that 
the journalist needs to reach out to a right-wing party or employer union for 
comment. If journalism fails to give a balanced view of the political initiative 
at hand and favours left-wing voices, coverage can be considered biased and 
therefore unprofessional. From a democracy perspective, biased journalism is 
dangerous, as it distorts the workings of the marketplace of ideas where the 
public should have equal access to differing ideas and viewpoints. 
However, making the lack of bias or the balance norm the sheer criteria for 
democratic journalism is not enough. Journalism scholars have repeatedly 
shown how professional journalism is dependent on the most powerful people 
in society (Tuchman 1978; Hall et al. 1978: Mills 2016). This is certainly 
understandable. News professionals are dependent on the most authoritative 
sources of information – politicians, officials, various experts and others – in 
order to carry out their work. However, when a consensus on foreign on 
economic policy, for example, prevails among the political elite and no 
alternative ideas emerge from within this cadre, the consensus is reflected by 
the lack of dissenting ideas in journalistic representations (Hallin 1984; 
Lounasmeri 2017). Therefore, a lack of bias should not be the sole criterion for 
democratic journalism. 
Another criterion for democratic journalism is the plurality of actors given 
space to voice their opinions. Journalism should reflect the heterogeneity of 
societies by giving room to a variety of voices to advance deliberation between 
different groups and actors. By giving voice to a wide range of societal actors 
– from politicians to the civil society organization and the common people – 
pluralist journalism helps to nurture debates on common problems. 
Journalism should give space to those groups and people who, due to such 
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structural factors as economic inequalities, do not enjoy the same level of 
media access as the more dominant societal groups (Raeijmaekers and 
Maeseele 2015; 1053–1054). 
When addressing the journalistic representations of European austerity, 
the plurality of the austerity coverage is certainly an issue of utmost 
importance. Did professional journalism work to foster a pluralist, critical 
debate on the issue of austerity by giving space to a variety of voices?  However, 
critics have pointed out that journalism often offers a certain sanitized version 
of ideological pluralism, within certain politico-ideological limits that rule out 
ideas that would endanger the status quo or the existing political consensus 
(Glasser et al. 2009; Karppinen 2018). So, instead of merely analysing the 
plurality of voices of the austerity debate, the level of ideological contestation 
needs to be considered as well. Did professional journalism discuss European 
austerity as a natural and common-sense response beyond reasonable doubt, 
or did it, address differing ideological perspectives and varying solutions. Did 
journalism work to foster ideological contestation or did it address austerity 
as a common sense solution to the crisis? 
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5 ECONOMIC CRISIS, AUSTERITY AND 
JOURNALISM 
To understand the democratic performance of professional journalism amid 
the austerity debate, it is necessary to briefly go through the developments that 
led up to the euro crisis – a crisis that was triggered in 2010 by the widespread 
market panic concerning the public deficits of Greece (Patomäki 2013). The 
euro crisis has had tremendous economic and political consequences. 
Economically, the crisis locked Europe into a prolonged period of low 
economic growth and high unemployment. This was felt especially in the 
eurozone countries most hit by the downturn and fiscal austerity, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal. While Greece’s unemployment rate stood 
at 12 % in 2010, the country reached a record high of 27.9 % in 2013.3 Between 
2007 and 2014, the Greek economy contracted by 26 %.4 In addition to 
burdening European countries, the crisis was an existential threat to common 
currency. To calm the financial market, it took the famous promise from the 
President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, in 2012 to do 
“whatever it takes” (Draghi 2012) to preserve the common currency. Draghi 
made it clear that the central bank would ultimately provide the necessary 
liquidity for indebted eurozone members.   
Moreover, the crisis reshuffled the political landscape of Europe. This can 
be seen in the challenges faced by many mainstream parties in, for example, 
France, Italy, Greece, Spain and even Germany. The austerity measures and 
widespread social and economic hardship paved way for a populist backlash 
against established political forces. Such left-wing parties as Podemos in Spain 
or Syriza in Greece stem from the resentment against austerity measures. 
Another backlash emerged as well. The EU, ECB and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailed out troubled eurozone member countries via 
different loan arrangements. This resulted in a right-wing reaction against the 
common currency. In the right-wing narrative, the eurozone is essentially a 
mechanism of transferring tax-payer money from the prudential North into 
the profligate South. The rise of such Eurosceptic right-wing forces as the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is a sign of a right-wing euro criticism 
triggered by the management of the euro crisis (Slobodian and Plehwe 2019). 
The euro crisis stems from two intertwining factors. First, the euro crisis is 
a part of the global financial crisis. This was launched by the trouble in the US 
housing market in 2007-8. The global financial crisis was essentially a result 
of a steady build-up of global economic imbalances and private sector 
                                                
3 Euronews 20.8.2018 “Greek Bailout: The economy before and after” 
(https://www.euronews.com/2018/08/20/greek-bailout-the-economy-before-and-after) 




indebtedness. The crisis has its roots in the breakdown of the post-World War 
II Bretton Woods regime, used to regulate global capital flows and currency 
fluctuations (Tooze 2018). Gradually, the Bretton-Woods system became 
unsustainable, largely due to the large deficit in the US trade balance and was 
effectively ended by Richard Nixon’s 1971 announcement of the cancellation 
of the direct convertibility of US dollar to gold. Combined with economic 
globalization – undercutting the bargaining position of organized labour and 
thus wage growth – this period of deregulated finance led to rising levels of 
private indebtedness, especially in the US (Varoufakis 2013). 
Second, the euro crisis is a result of the structural issues of the eurozone. 
In Europe, the crisis left banks awash with worthless assets. The situation was 
made more difficult by the fundamentals of the common currency. Before the 
crisis, the common currency had fuelled the flows of capital into peripheral 
eurozone countries, contributing not only to rapid economic growth but also 
to the build-up of significant private debt bubbles. As the financial crisis 
grinded economic activity to a halt and the indebted banks had to be bailed-
out by the governments, the crisis countries had to resort to the ECB, IMF and 
the EU for financial assistance.  The membership in the common currency had 
stripped eurozone countries of much of their economic sovereignty (the 
printing presses and national currencies). When the financial markets 
declined to fund troubled governments, crisis countries were therefore left 
with loan agreements that came with strict conditions of fiscal austerity. This 
is essentially how a crisis fuelled by high levels of private sector debt mutated 
into a sovereign debt crisis that was tackled through austerity (Blyth 2015). 
Ultimately, five eurozone member countries – Greece, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus 
and Spain – went through the controversial bail-out programs. Deemed 
necessary by European political leaders to regain the lost market trust and 
economic competitiveness (Borriello 2017), the austerity measures sparked 
political protests and saw prominent economists criticizing the EU’s austerity 
approach as reckless and counter-productive (e.g. Krugman 2011). 
But why austerity? When the financial crisis and paralysis of the global 
financial markets system took the global economy to the brink of a total 
meltdown in 2008–9, political decision-makers all over the world resorted to 
stimulus policies to boost economic activity. The US as well as Europe were 
suddenly favouring Keynesian policy ideas. For a while, it looked as if the crisis 
would deliver a paradigm shift in dominant economic policy ideas after 
decades of neoliberal austerity and financial deregulation (Blyth 2015, 
Whiteside 2016). Even the IMF, traditionally a bastion of fiscal austerity and 
free market ideas, came out in favour of coordinated measures of fiscal 
stimulus, and nation states from China and US to Germany, the UK and Spain 
engaged in stimulus spending to combat the economic downturn (Blyth 2015, 
55–56). 
However, a shift to austerity took place in 2010. This was due to various 
factors. Germany, the largest eurozone economy and the most important 
player in European economic policymaking, started to argue that spending 
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had to make room for fiscal discipline (Blyth 2015, 61). This echoed a 
historical, deep-rooted German economic policy ideology according to which 
budgetary discipline and international competitiveness are the most 
important drivers of economic prosperity (Brunnermeir et al. 2016). The 
German austerity stance was backed by the then ECB president Jean Claude 
Trichet, who in 2010 argued that the rapid growth of public debt had to be 
combated with fiscal consolidation (Trichet 2010). 
This narrative quickly started to dominate not only the debate on the euro 
crisis but European economic policymaking as well. Scholars have identified 
the leading role that Germany played in the crisis management as the key 
initiator of collective policy measures (Hennessy 2013; Krampf 2014; Meiers 
2015). The austerity approach was dominant not only in the crisis countries 
that had to go through the programs of fiscal austerity and competitiveness-
enhancing structural reforms. Governments in countries such as the UK (non-
euro member that was not put in a squeeze by the financial markets) also 
started to implement austerity measures to reduce public expenditure and 
ensure market confidence (Basu 2018). 
Several interwoven factors played a role in the austerity drive. 
Macroeconomics certainly played a part. Some prominent economists made 
the argument to European decision-makers that the benefits of spending cuts 
would offset any recessionary effects that austerity would have on aggregate 
demand (Helgadóttir 2016). The allure of austerity was in part due to political 
opportunism. The argument about the need for austerity was an efficient 
strategy to justify controversial policies and reforms (Jabko 2013; Stanley 
2014). However, it should be noted that it was not only centre-right politicians 
like the German chancellor Angela Merkel who were the cheerleaders of 
austerity; the European social democrats largely accepted austerity as well 
(Bremer 2018).  
Further, the economic constitution of Europe played a role in the austerity 
drive. Memberships in the EU and in the common currency work to discipline 
membership states to pursue fiscal discipline via setting limits on public debt 
and deficits (Blyth 2015). Particularly the eurozone works to limit the 
possibilities of economic policymaking, as eurozone members are stripped of 
a central bank and a monetary policy through which to offset the negative 
effects of economic downturns or shocks. 
Whatever the main reason, from 2010 onwards, austerity emerged as the 
main tool of combatting the economic crisis. How journalism represented the 
policies of austerity is a theme of this thesis. Did journalism work to foster a 
pluralist and critical debate on European austerity measures, or did it, 
alternatively, work to enforce the narrative on the necessity of austerity?   
These are still important questions. Despite the popularity of various social 
media platforms, economic issues and policy debates are still common in 
mainstream journalistic platforms. Although people tend to get their news 
online to a growing extent, traditional news organisations have a strong 
presence in digital media spheres. News circulated on social media is often 
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produced by professional journalists working for well-established news media. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the mainstream news media was a key factor 
in orchestrating how the financial crisis and politics of austerity unfolded in 
the eyes and minds of the British public (Berry 2019). 
To put it simply, citizens know what is going on in the economy by 
consuming journalistic representations of economic issues. Of course, many 
people feel the very material effects of economic recessions, for example, but 
it is via journalism that most people get their information about the workings 
of the economy. Is the national economic output growing? What about 
imports, exports and unemployment? What are the reasons behind economic 
downturns or, alternatively, economic prosperity? Facts and views on the 
economy are presented to the public by professional journalists with the help 
of economic data, economists, market analysts and other experts. Research 
has indicated that there are connections between journalistic coverage of the 
economy and public sentiments about economic policy issues (see Sanders and 
Gavin 2004). 
It is safe to say that in contemporary societies, the economy is very much 
“mediatized” (Phelan 2007, 32) as politicians, officials, bankers, CEOs and 
others seek to control market actors’ expectations via media. Think of a 
modern central banker who via the international press manages the 
expectations and actions of international bond market investors and private 
consumers by committing to a policy of low or high interest rates. Take, for 
instance, the prime minister who again via media seeks to reassure the market 
that the country is committed to budgetary discipline and structural reforms. 
Importantly for this thesis, professional journalism is also a space where 
economic policy decisions are legitimised by providing public rationalisations 
for chosen policy measures (Schranz and Eisenegger 2011; Mylonas 2012). 
Thus, journalism is very much a site where consent to the social order is 
produced (Carragee 1993). In this field, actors present different 
interpretations of economic phenomena and provide justifications for 
different policy alternatives. Not only does journalism transmit economic facts 
from experts to the public, but it also allows certain definitions of economic 
phenomena to resonate and plays down alternative interpretations (Doudaki 
et al. 2019). For example, instead of merely reflecting an economic crisis, 
journalism works to construct it as a shared phenomenon that necessitates 
certain policies and decisions. 
Of course, and despite the staying power of traditional news organisation, 
it is reasonable to question the salience of the standard critical perspective—
that mainstream journalism is a means of producing the social order—when 
the field of political communication is in a state of flux (see Davis 2019). 
Professional journalism’s economic difficulties, declining media trust, rising 
political conflicts and abundant digital media cast doubt on the notion that 
professional journalism can enshrine consensus and ensure the dominance of 
elite and expert ideas in the eyes of the mass public. Indeed, journalism 
scholarship has reflected on whether the differences between the mediated 
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representations of the economy and the experiences of ordinary citizens in 
deindustrialised parts of the UK and US partly explain the scale of the shock 
Brexit and Trump caused in public discourse (Davis 2018, 167). 
Scholars, therefore, have argued that alternative views on media and power 
are needed. Increasing attention has been paid to analysing how journalism, 
particularly forms of international financial journalism, functions as an arena 
for inter-elite communication and conflict management (Davis 2003). High-
profile economic journalistic outlets such as The Financial Times are elite 
spheres in which the global decision-making class comes together to discuss 
the challenges facing the global economy and to forge a consensus on the 
desired policy goals (Ojala 2017). The financial media is a network through 
which economy policy narratives, for instance, supporting free-market 
economics and light-touch financial regulation are circulated within 
transnational elites. Davis (2011) argues that during the decades building up 
to the financial crisis, these narratives fuelled ‘finanzialisation’, a process in 
which financial sector and various financial instruments have come to play 
growing roles in the economy and various sectors of society (see Davis and 
Walsh 2017). 
So, how should one think of the democratic role of journalism during an 
economic crisis, and how should journalism cover such turbulent events as 
economic crises?  If one subscribes to the idea that professional journalism has 
certain functions in democratic societies, it is reasonable to argue that 
journalism should fulfil these functions during economic distress as well. First, 
if journalism is seen as a marketplace of ideas that should accurately represent 
social heterogeneity, the role of journalism is to provide the public with various 
viewpoints about an economic crisis. In addition to providing accurate 
information and rigorous analysis about the unfolding and characteristics of 
the crisis, professional journalism should reflect the multitude of diverse views 
on the economic crisis. 
Should one take a more deliberative or facilitative approach, journalism 
should not merely reflect diverse views about an economic crisis. It should 
foster a rational debate about the causes of the crisis as well as on the policy 
responses required by the by crisis. Ideally, the consensus reached in this open 
debate would lead to a well-informed public opinion, reflected in the policy 
decisions taken to combat the crisis.  
A more agonistic approach would see that the role of journalism amid an 
economic crisis would be to deconstruct and challenge hegemonic 
assumptions about the economy and economic policymaking. What signifies a 
pluralist debate on economic policy is not (merely) the rationality of the 
arguments but the diversity of ideological viewpoints. 
How has journalism represented various economic crises? It is safe to say 
that, in terms of such democratic values as pluralism and ideological diversity, 
the picture painted by critical scholarship is rather bleak. The scholarship 
shows how journalism has not fostered a pluralist debate during economic 
crises. Instead, it has worked to shield dominant economic policy ideas and 
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elites from contestation. During the inflammatory period of industrial action 
in Britain in the 1970s, journalists presented the UK government’s economic 
assumptions as responsible, while the wage claims made by British labour 
unions were deemed as excessive (Philo et al. 1995, 32–33). The neoliberal 
turn of the 1970s and 1980s in Britain was rendered a natural part of the 
modernization of Britain, echoing the Thatcherite narrative about the 
dangerous excesses of the welfare state and union power (see Hall 1988). 
Similarly, the Financial Times coverage of the currency crisis in Thailand in 
1997 advanced ideas that aligned with the austerity and free-market position 
of the IMF (Durham 2007). The idea that market perspectives should 
ultimately work as the judge of economic policymaking dominated the 
coverage of the Swedish economic crisis in the 1990s (Mårtenson 2000, 127–
128). 
Instead of creating a vibrant space for deliberation on economic policy, 
professional journalism, it would seem, has worked to legitimate certain ideas. 
The reasons for this are manifold. Journalists’ dependency on elite sources has 
been well-established by journalism scholarship. To produce news efficiently 
and in accordance with the professional norms of balance and neutrality, 
journalists need sources who are considered legitimate and authoritative 
experts on the issue at hand (Tuchman 1978, Sigal 1986; Berkowitz 2008). In 
economic policy debates, this refers to political and administrative elites, 
economists, market analysts and financiers (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010; 
Basu 2018). 
The tendency to favour established sources arguably has been intensified 
by journalism’s economics woes and the diminishing resources allocated to 
newsrooms, making it increasingly difficult to produce the kind of pluralist 
journalism that would serve a more multi-voiced democratic debate 
(McChesney 2003; Hardy 2014). Scholarship has also indicated that 
journalists sometimes identify such ideas as austerity and free-market reforms 
with common-sense solutions to economic problems (Phelan 2014). Media 
scholars have argued that the shifts in the Western political economy since the 
1970s have also had impacts on economic news (Davis 2019, 165–166). The 
post-war Keynesian consensus made room for the privatisation of state 
industries and deindustrialisation, while consumer credit and financial 
instruments started to play increasing roles in political and social life. 
Research on the UK has shown that as the importance of the financial sector 
grew, economic news became more attuned to the concerns of the financial 
sector (Philo 1993; Davis 2018). Labour reporting became less common, and 
financial sector sources and corporate interests started to dominate economic 
news, contributing to less pluralistic notions about the very essence of the 
“economy”, as well as to more stories hostile to government interventions in 
economic policy-making (Davis 2019, 166–167). 
The financial crisis and the euro crisis have certainly accelerated the media 
scholarship on journalism and the economic crises. Various scholars have 
analysed the relationship between professional journalism and the crisis. 
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From a democracy perspective, the results have thus far been discouraging. 
Critical scholarship has found that journalism did not rise to its watchdog role 
before the burst of the global crisis. Financial journalism failed to alert the 
public about the imbalances and speculative bubbles in the financialized 
global economy (Barber 2015; O’Brien 2015; Starkman 2015). Mainstream 
financial journalism in such publications as the Washington Post routinely 
favoured business sources, analysts and public relations professional when 
covering the pre-crisis financial market, thus focusing the public attention on 
various business opportunities and investor issues (Knowles et al. 2017). 
Similarly, multiple journalism scholars have analysed how journalism 
represented the austerity measures implemented after the outburst of the 
crisis. This scholarship shows how journalism coalesced around the narrative 
of necessary austerity. Mainstream journalism – from the US to Britain and 
Greece – favoured government and other elite sources and failed to produce 




6 THE CASE STUDIES 
In this thesis, I will analyse the journalistic representations of euro crisis 
austerity. This dissertation comprises of four individual articles. In the 
following, section I will give a short introduction to each of the articles and 
discuss briefly how each article contributes to the thesis. I will address the 
methodological and theoretical aspects of the articles later in this synopsis 
chapter.  
6.1 ARTICLE 1: MEDIATING THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY: 
ORDOLIBERAL FRAMING IN EUROPEAN PRESS 
COVERAGE OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
Article I analyses the European press coverage of the eurozone crisis with a 
quantitative frame analysis. The sample includes 7989 newspaper articles 
from eight European countries between February 2010 and July 2012. The 
sample includes newspaper articles on the eurozone crisis from Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Finland. This early 
period of the crisis was, in many ways, vital, as many of the central approaches 
and mechanisms that characterized the management of the crisis were put in 
motion. This period included, for example, the eurozone agreement on 100€ 
billion intervention on Greece as well as various calls from European Central 
Bank (ECB) and leading Eurozone politicians to austerity. 
The starting point for article I is that the German government has played a 
central role in the management of the euro crisis. From loan agreements to 
strengthening fiscal coordination among eurozone countries, the German 
government has been the prime mover of European economic policymaking. 
The European policy stance has largely fallen in line with the approach 
favoured by the German government. However, the German positions has not 
gone unchallenged. The ECB, for example, has in many occasions acted against 
the will of Germany. The German austerity approach has met severe criticism 
as well. Therefore, Germany has had to convince the European public and 
European policymakers of the need for austerity and structural reforms. 
Article I argues that the public domain is a central sphere for the 
construction of policy acceptance. The study analyses to what extent Germany 
has been able to consolidate its view on the necessity of austerity in the 
European public sphere. The study argues that the German government has 
frequently drawn from the German economic policy tradition of 
ordoliberalism to gain popular support for austerity and supply side reforms. 
The ordoliberal tradition – which puts adherence to a set of binding rules to 
the fore of economic policy making – has a major role in the German national 
narrative concerning the highly-competitive German social market economy. 
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By ordoliberal framing, the study argues, the German government has 
constructed an account of the eurozone crisis, which emphasizes loose fiscal 
discipline and lack of competitiveness as the main sources of the crisis. 
Accordingly, the ordoliberal frame stresses austerity and structural reforms as 
the primary treatment recommendations to the crisis. 
Article I analyses to what extent the German framing has dominated the 
European public debate on the eurozone crisis. With a quantitative frame 
analysis, the study observes whether the ordoliberal frame has dominated the 
debate and whether a competing Keynesian agenda – emphasizing the 
structural problems of the eurozone and advocating fiscal stimulus – is 
reflected in the European public sphere. By analysing the salience of different 
policy approaches in the European public sphere, article I analyses how 
pervasive the German-led austerity agenda was in the European press.  
6.2 ARTICLE II: ESTABLISHED IDEAS FROM 
ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS: AUSTERITY AND 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE FINNISH 
ECONOMIC POLICY DEBATE
Article II analyses the endurance of neoliberal policy ideas in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis. The staying power of austerity and endurance of 
neoliberal policy ideas has challenged the expectations of some political 
scientists and political economists who have emphasized that major economic 
crises have accelerated counter-hegemonic policy paradigms. The post-
financial crisis conjuncture has, on the contrary, witnessed the persistence of 
neoliberal ideas and the institutions implementing them. 
Taking Finland and the leading Finnish daily newspaper Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS) as a case study, article II analyses the relationship between 
neoliberal policy ideas, economic policy institutions and journalism. With a 
qualitative approach, the study analyses the Finnish economic policy debate 
during the financial and euro crises (from 2009 to 2014) and illustrates the 
interplay between the most powerful economic policy institutions and the 
mainstream media. 
The study examines how the established institutional forces prevent major 
ideational paradigm shifts even during major economic crises. As the Finnish 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and EU institutions such as the ECB started to 
demand austerity and structural reforms to combat public deficits and debt, 
journalism quickly followed suit. The political elite coalesced around the 
consensus formed by the EU and the MoF. This led to a lack of alternative 
articulations on the preferred stance of economic policy. The study argues that 
while a strong consensus on issues of economic policymaking prevails among 
the political elite, journalism has difficulties in producing alternative 
viewpoints. Thus, instead of fostering a democratic debate on economic policy, 
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journalism often works to strengthen a post-democratic public sphere, where 
certain assumptions are shielded from severe political contestation. 
6.3 ARTICLE III: REASON OVER POLITICS: THE 
ECONOMIST’S HISTORICAL FRAMING OF 
AUSTERITY 
Article III analyses the relationship between austerity and journalism from a 
historical perspective. With a qualitative frame analysis, the study asks how 
The Economist – which exemplifies many of the virtues of professional 
journalism – has historically addressed the question of austerity during times 
of economic distress. By pinpointing three historical periods during which 
austerity was widely debated in the pages of The Economist, the study explores 
whether journalism’s framing of austerity has remained the same. The three 
austerity periods identified by the study are austerity policies in post-World 
War II Britain, austerity in France in the 1980s, and austerity during the global 
financial crisis and the euro crisis. 
The study shows how journalistic frames can prove to be resilient. Despite 
the differences between the analysed austerity periods, journalism’s framing 
of austerity policies has remained remarkably intact since the post-Second 
World War era. The Economist has consistently framed austerity as a difficult 
yet necessary fix to economic problems, caused by economic shocks or 
politically tempting, yet economically illiterate, ideas.  Indeed, article III seeks 
to the shed light on the historical relationship between professional journalism 
and powerful economic ideas, such as austerity. 
6.4 ARTICLE IV: THE ECONOMIST’S 
DEPOLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN AUSTERITY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF A ‘EUPHEMIZED’
NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE 
Article IV moves to analyse how The Economist newspaper represented 
austerity amid the European austerity drive in 2010–2012. The starting point 
for article IV is that the economic predicament has accelerated the scholarship 
on journalism, austerity and neoliberalism. The scholarship, however, lacks a 
nuanced analysis on how elite economic journalism has portrayed austerity 
during the crisis and contributed to the legitimization of the neoliberal 
discourse. Moreover, the study argues that the scholarship has largely 
neglected the differences between different neoliberal discourses when 
analysing mediated representations of austerity. The study makes use of the 
distinction between a “transparent” neoliberal discourse (constituted via an 
antagonistic relationship between the market and the state) and a 
“euphemized” neoliberal discourse, which adopts a “post-political” style 
The case studies 
44 
wherein the adversarial nature of politics should make room for a pragmatic 
and rational consensus. The study argues that the distinction is useful for 
journalism scholars interested in the interplay between neoliberalism and the 
media. Often, quality journalism and elite economic journalism steer clear of 
the more transparent representation of neoliberal policy ideas. Scholars 
therefore need nuanced definitions of neoliberalism to see how neoliberalism 
plays out in different media.  
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7 DATA USED IN THE THESIS 
This thesis is founded upon different sets of empirical material. However, the 
data are comprised solely of journalistic articles that have been published in 
mainstream European newspapers. Other forms of journalistic media – such 
as television and radio – have not been considered in the thesis.  
Article I is built upon a vast amount of material gathered in a large-scale 
comparative research project that examined how the euro crisis was portrayed 
by European news media in 2010–2012 (see Pickard 2015). In the project, 
researchers analysed over 10 000 articles from 40 newspapers from 10 
European countries – Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. From each country, four newspapers 
were chosen: the leading business/financial paper, the leading conservative 
and liberal papers and the leading tabloid. These papers were searched for 
articles that dealt with the euro crisis. Content analysis was used to identify 
and code, among various other elements, the main themes addressed in the 
euro crisis and the main news sources used by journalists.   
Importantly for article I, the problem definitions (PDs, “what caused the 
crisis?”) and preferred treatment recommendations (TRs, “what should be 
done?”) were analysed and coded from each article.5 To analyse the public 
legitimation of austerity and the German ordoliberal narrative about the euro 
crisis, we used data from this research to map out the most salient problem 
definitions of the crisis in eurozone area newspapers. (As non-eurozone 
members, UK and Poland were left out the analysis.) Moreover, we analysed 
the most frequent treatment recommendations mentioned in the eurozone 
press. For the analysis, we identified PDs and TRs that corresponded with an 
“ordoliberal” (Bonefeld 2012) reading of the crisis. In our analysis, an 
ordoliberal reading of the crisis accounts for an interpretation that sees the 
crisis stemming from excessive amounts of public debt and the lack of 
competitiveness of the eurozone crisis countries. Accordingly, the crisis should 
be dealt with competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms and fiscal 
austerity. Moreover, we identified PDs and TRs that were in line with a 
“Keynesian” reading of the crisis. In a Keynesian reading, the flawed structure 
of the eurozone as well as the crisis in the global economy were emphasized as 
the root causes of the crisis. In our analysis, a Keynesian policy approach 
would be to emphasize the importance of fiscal and monetary stimulus and 
debt haircuts or even contemplate the breakup of the eurozone.   
Article II uses articles from the leading Finnish national daily newspaper 
HS to analyse the public interplay between economic ideas and the dominant 
institutions of economic policymaking between 2009 and 2014. We collected 
                                                
5 For a more detailed description of the methods and coding used in the research project, see 
Appendixes 1, 2 and 3 in Pickard 2015b.  
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articles around two yearly events concerning the preparation and drafting of 
the Finnish budget. By focusing on these moments around the drafting of the 
annual budget, we were able to pinpoint the moments during which 
representatives of various institutions commented on economic problems and 
preferred problem solutions. The search periods around the yearly events were 
confined to two-week periods. The electronic archive of HS was searched using 
various keywords on economic policy and the budget. The total number of 
articles was 119. 
In article II, we argue that HS plays a fundamental role in the Finnish 
public sphere and in the debates on economic policy. Not only is HS the largest 
daily subscription newspaper in Finland and in the Nordic countries 
(Nordicom 2014), it also belongs to the rather confined circle of Finnish elite 
media, nurturing a consensual political culture in which political and 
economic elites coalesce around ideas that are thought of as serving the 
national interest (Lounasmeri 2017). 
Articles III and IV utilize articles gathered from the influential weekly 
business magazine The Economist. Two factors make The Economist an 
interesting object of research. First, The Economist – established in Britain in 
1843 to work as the vanguard of liberalism and free-market ideas – is a prime 
example of elite journalism whose readers consist of global decision-makers 
(Edwards 1995, 2–3; Starr 2004; Davis 2017). Such journalistic outlets as The 
Economist or the Financial Times work as inter-elite public spheres where the 
global elite can deliberate on issues of global importance. And despite its clear 
status as an elite publication, The Economist embodies many of the values 
central to professional journalism (see Parsons 1989, 26; Hartley 2010). 
Therefore, it is interesting to analyse how The Economist has historically 
portrayed austerity, as it tells us about the interplay between professional 
journalism and economic ideas. 
I used The Economist historical archive to look for The Economist articles 
that included the word “austerity”. I started by examining how often the word 
occurred between 1843 and 2013. The term first occurred in 1843 but was 
rarely used before the Second World War. For article III, I identified historical 
periods during which the use of the word austerity peaked. The first peak of 
the use of word “austerity” occurred after the Second World War, and it started 
to gain visibility again in the 1970s and 1980s. However, after that the term 
started to lose momentum until the global financial crisis made austerity a 
global buzzword. In article III, I analyse the historical similarities and 
differences in The Economist’s austerity coverage between the three peak 
periods. Article IV utilizes the same articles but concentrates on analysing the 
final austerity peak, the intensive debate on austerity during the euro crisis. 
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8 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
This thesis uses a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to 
assess the journalistic austerity debate. The next section will address the 
questions of theory and methodology, and how the different approaches help 
to address the question on journalism’s democratic functions amid the 
austerity debate.  
8.1 THE LEGITIMATION OF AUSTERITY IN THE 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE 
The starting point for article I is that the euro crisis is a significant moment in 
the evolution of a European public sphere. Traditionally, the debate about the 
need for a European public sphere has been motivated by the notion that 
European integration has been an elite-driven project and lacked popular 
legitimacy (e.g. Koopmans and Statham 2010). What Europe needs is, 
therefore, a European public sphere where Europeans could rationally 
deliberate on issues of common concern and provide the European project 
with popular legitimacy (Habermas 2001). However, scholars have argued 
that due to the considerable variety of languages and political cultures in 
Europe, the idea of a common European public sphere is inconceivable 
(Lingenberg 2009, 46–47; Trenz 2008, 56). News agendas are largely 
dominated by national issues, and people construct their political identities by 
following national policy debates. By contrast, the EU has been characterized 
by a lack of democratic elements – a government–opposition setting, for 
example – that would spark popular interest on European politics (Mair 2013). 
   The euro crisis, however, was a potential turning point (Herkman and 
Harjuniemi 2015). Suddenly, the European news agenda was dominated by a 
common European issue, the economic crisis. Journalism was geared towards 
addressing an issue of common European interest and played close attention 
to policy developments and debates in various European countries. The crisis 
was a moment that could give birth to a critical and reasoned European debate 
that would spark popular interests towards European integration, a project 
thus far characterized by technocratic tendencies.  
At the same time, however, the crisis proved to be an opportunity for 
European elites to legitimize austerity measures in the eyes of the European 
public. In particular, it was an opportunity for Germany and its chancellor 
Angela Merkel – the most prominent leader in public debate on the euro crisis 
(Hubé et al. 2015) – to provide the European public with a German 
interpretation of the crisis, an interpretation according to which Europe needs 
austerity and structural reforms to remain competitive in a globalized world 
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economy. Thus, we deploy a quantitative frame analysis to examine the 
salience of the German ordoliberal framing of the crisis in European 
newspapers. We focus on the German tradition of ordoliberalism6 as a 
strategic tool for the legitimization of policy decisions. 
Journalism and media scholars often refer to the concept framing when 
analysing the salience given to different policy ideas and rationalizations by 
the media (Entman 2007; Maeseele 2010; Reese 2010). In short, framing is a 
process in which certain aspects of social reality are made more salient than 
others. Frames work by pinpointing a problem and offering a recommendation 
on how the treat the problem at hand (Entman 1993). Accordingly, in article I 
we analyse the most salient problem definitions and treatment 
recommendations given by European press to analyse whether the German 
ordoliberal frame dominated the European press coverage of the crisis. 
8.2 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLICY IDEAS AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN JOURNALISM 
The starting point for article II was the realization that the financial crisis and 
the euro crisis did not lead to any major re-interpretation of dominant 
economic policy ideas. On the contrary, the post-financial crisis conjuncture 
has witnessed the staying power of neoliberal ideas and strengthening of such 
non-majoritarian institutions as the ECB enforcing them. This has gone 
against the notion that economic crises have historically fostered institutional 
change and advanced the emergence of new policy paradigms. This was the 
case when post-war Keynesian welfare state policies became the target of a 
neoliberal charge during the 1970s and 1980s (Hall 1993; Blyth 2001).  
In article II, we examine the public dynamics between economic policy 
ideas and economic policy institutions. We examine why no ideational shift 
                                                
6 Ordoliberalism is a strand of liberalism for which economists and lawyers at the University of 
Freiburg laid foundations in the 1930s. Disillusioned by the crisis of laissez-faire liberalism of the 19th 
century and, on the other hand, aghast by the rise of fascism, socialism and economic thought that 
envisaged a role for the state an active economic planner, ordoliberals sought to provide new foundations 
for liberalism (Foucault 2008). In ordoliberal thought, a strong state is needed to create and uphold a 
rule-based framework for a competitive market economy. The strong state uses its legislative and 
regulative power to combat, for example, cartels and monopolies and other excessive concentrations of 
economic power. At the same time, however, the state should refrain from active economic management 
or planning. Independent central banks and rule-based fiscal policy are a part of the ordoliberal 
economic playbook. The favored German policies amid the eurozone crisis have at least partly been 
attributed to the ongoing attachment to the ordoliberal tradition (e.g. Dullien and Guérot 2012; 
Berghahn and Young 2013; Biebricher 2013). Importantly, economic ideas underpinning ordoliberalism 
are a central part of the German political culture (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). Ordoliberalism 
has a central part in the popular German narrative about the founding of the prosperous and stable 
“social market economy” after the Second World War (Bonefeld 2012).     
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occurred after the global financial crisis, using the economic policy debates in 
Finland between 2009 and 2014 as a case study. Theoretically, article II draws 
from ideological institutionalism, which is interested in the importance of 
ideas in policy change (Hay 2001; Koning 2016). Ideational institutionalists 
argue that policy changes do not simply reflect structural power or 
institutional factors. Ideational institutionalists argue that ideas also matter. 
It is especially during times of economic distress – when dominant ideas are 
fragile – when “the politics of ideas becomes increasingly important” (Blyth 
2001, 3–4). Indeed, ideational institutionalists are interested in how different 
actors (elites to a large extent, but also other less powerful groups) use ideas 
to challenge the prevailing order. 
In article II, we argue that journalism studies go well with the ideational 
institutionalist research strand. The role of the media is essential in the 
ideational struggles between various agents and institutions (Carstensen and 
Schmidt 2016, 325–327). The journalistic representations of economic crises 
might either lead to the contestation of dominant ideas and institutions or 
further strengthen established policy ideas and the legitimacy of dominant 
institutions. 
With a qualitative textual analysis (Fürsich 2009, 241) we analyse 119 
articles and identify the most prominent sources and agents of the Finnish 
economic policy debate between 2009 and 2014. The textual analysis 
concentrates on identifying the dominant “programmatic” (Baker and 
Underhill 2015, 1) economic ideas concerning the state of the Finnish economy 
and the proposed solutions. This method gives us ample space to interpret 
these dominant ideas within the institutional and historical context of Finnish 
economic policymaking. 
8.3 THE HISTORICAL FRAMING OF AUSTERITY
Article III addresses the historical relationship between journalism and 
austerity. A growing body of research has payed attention to journalism and 
austerity amid the financial crisis and the euro crisis, but the scholarship has 
lacked a historical perspective. With a qualitative frame analysis approach, 
article III examines how The Economist has addressed austerity during 
periods of economic turmoil between 1947 and 2012. The study pinpoints 
three distinctive periods of austerity: austerity in post-World War II Britain, 
austerity in Francois Mitterrand’s France in the early 1980s, and austerity 
during the euro crisis in 2010–2012. The study identifies that during these 
periods, The Economist’s use of the word austerity peaked. Here, a qualitative 
approach to framing was chosen to analyse The Economist’s austerity 
coverage. A qualitative approach allows the researcher to more fully emphasize 
the political context of journalism (Hardin and Whiteside 2010; Linström and 
Marais 2012). 
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The goal of the study is to examine the historical relationship between 
professional journalism and economic ideas. Especially since the Second 
World War, journalists have believed in the Enlightenment values of reason 
and progress (Kantola 2016, 424–427). It was during the 20th century when 
journalism developed a semi-scientific identity (Schudson 1978; Tuchman 
1978) and started to believe in the ideals of objectivity and neutrality. The aim 
of the article is to dissect the relationship between these professional ideals 
and the journalistic coverage of influential economic ideas. Article III 
illustrates the staying power of journalistic frames and shows how the 
journalistic framing of austerity has remained remarkably intact since the 
1940s. Moreover, article III aims to further problematize the “post-
ideological” nature of political journalism and witness to the inherently 
political nature of journalistic framing. 
8.4 THE DEPOLITICIZATION OF AUSTERITY BY 
ECONOMIC JOURNALISM: A DISCOURSE THEORY 
PERSPECTIVE
Article IV utilizes discourse theory to analyse the nexus between journalism, 
austerity and neoliberalism. The starting point of the study is that the financial 
crisis and the euro crisis have accelerated the scholarship on journalism, 
austerity and neoliberalism. Various scholars have argued that journalism 
addressed the economic crisis as a public sector debt crisis and worked to 
naturalize the neoliberal policy prescription of austerity and structural 
reforms (Tracy 2012; Preston and Silke 2014; Doudaki et al. 2019). 
The study, however, argues that the scholarship has thus far neglected the 
differences between different types of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is, indeed, 
a concept that is hard to grasp (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). It is often 
discussed in the context of the paradigm shift that took place in the global 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s as labour unions and expansive welfare states 
were discredited as an economic burden in a globalizing world. For such 
neoliberals as Margaret Thatcher, neoliberalism was an antagonistic rupture 
from the post-war social democratic consensus (Phelan 2007).  
However, scholars have also discussed neoliberalism in the context of the 
thesis on “post-politics” or “end of ideology” (Mouffe 2005: Zizek 2008). 
According to this thesis, it has been impossible to envisage a realist option for 
liberal capitalism since the fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet Union. In the age 
of post-politics, neoliberalism is not characterized by an agonistic relationship 
between politico-ideological projects but by a consensus on the broad lines of 
the global economy. Neoliberalism is an attempt to eliminate the antagonistic 
nature of politics in the name of pragmatism (Phelan 2007). This non-
ideological ideology was crystallized by the centre-left governments of Tony 
Blair and Bill Clinton in the UK and US in the 1990s. 
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Thus, article IV calls for differentiating between different neoliberalism. 
Following Phelan (2007), the study distinguishes between a “transparent” 
neoliberal discourse – constructed via an antagonistic relationship between 
the inefficient state and the virtuous private sector – and a “euphemized” 
neoliberal discourse that eschews ideological antagonisms and adopts a post-
political posture. Article IV argues that this is a useful distinction for 
journalism scholars. Professional journalism takes political detachment and 
objectivity seriously (Phelan and Dawes 2018) and often sees itself as a non-
ideological mediator of realism (Phelan 2014, 84–85). Thus, scholars 
interested in how neoliberal discourses play out in journalism need nuanced 
definitions of neoliberalism. 
To illustrate these dynamics, I examined how The Economist covered 
European austerity between 2010 and 2012. I analysed 100 articles in The 
Economist using discourse theory concepts as a methodological toolkit to 
examine how the magazine constructed a euphemized neoliberal discourse 
during the debate on European austerity. Drawing from both Marxist theory 
and post-structuralism, discourse theory stresses the contingent nature of 
identity and reality (Laclau and Mouffe 2014; Laclau 1990). Discourse theory 
stresses that dominant political formations are not a result of immanent 
material or economic laws, but they derive from hegemonic discursive 
articulations (Carpentier et al. 2019) Discourses are constructed via the linking 
of various elements or signifiers to constitute a chain of equivalence (Laclau 
1996), and the articulation is given coherence by naming an outside agent 
(Phelan 2009, 220). The transparent neoliberal discourse, for example, is 
articulated via the linking of “free markets”, “entrepreneurship” and 
“innovation” and by constructing an antagonistic relationship with the 
socialist or social democratic other (Phelan and Dahlberg 2011). The 
“euphemistic” neoliberal discourse, on the contrary, disavows such political 
antagonisms, as the chain of equivalence is constructed through equating such 
signifiers as “consensus”, “progression”, “pragmatism” and the “common 
good”. Antagonisms and conflicts persist, of course, but they are depoliticized. 
They become confrontations between the reasonable modernizers and the 




The following section will briefly present the findings of articles I–IV. 
9.1 LIMITED ALTERNATIVES TO DOMINANT 
NARRATIVES IN THE EUROPEAN AUSTERITY 
DEBATE 
The articles find limited amounts of ideological alternatives within the 
journalistic debate on austerity. Article I shows how the German “ordoliberal” 
frame was the dominant frame in European news media in 2010–2012. Article 
I argues that the German government, arguably the dominant force when it 
comes to European economic policymaking, was able to use the European 
news media as a tool to legitimize austerity as the necessary way to deal with 
the crisis. 
Article I shows the ordoliberal framing of the euro crisis enjoying 
widespread salience across the eight studied eurozone countries. According to 
the ordoliberal framing, the root problem of the crisis lay with excessive public 
indebtedness and the lack of competitiveness of the crisis countries. The 
concern over public finances dominated the debate over the roots of the crisis 
particularly in Finland, Germany, Belgium, Germany and Greece. Accordingly, 
the European news media downplayed the alternative, “Keynesian” reading of 
the crisis that emphasized the EMU (The Economic and Monetary Union) 
structure or the global economic turmoil as the root causes of the crisis. 
However, although the dominant narrative circulated by European 
journalism certainly was the “ordoliberal” one, the picture is a bit more 
nuanced. Indeed, article I shows that there were, to some extent, national 
differences in the coverage of the euro crisis. In France, Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands, newspapers were more inclined to address the problematic 
structure of the eurozone as the root of the crisis.  
The same can be said about the treatment recommendations. Overall, the 
dominant nature of the ordoliberal frame meant that the European press 
presented austerity and structural reforms as the main tools to combat the 
euro crisis.  Again, however, there is a degree of national variation. In France, 
for example, the idea that steps towards a fiscal union should be taken in 
Europe to repair the dysfunctional structure of the EMU was prominent. In 
the German press, this idea was downplayed.  
Although the findings corroborate the notion that the European news 
media largely echoed the elite consensus on the necessity of austerity policies, 
it also paints a more nuanced picture. Article I finds not only similarities but 
also differences within the European press when it comes to covering the 
European economic crisis. The reasons for these differences are beyond this 
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study, but it is reasonable to assume that they stem from national differences 
in economic policy traditions (Brunnermeir et al. 2016) as well as differences 
in journalistic cultures (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The findings do suggest 
that German government was able to use the European news media as a tool 
to legitimize the need for austerity in the eyes of the European public, but 
national newspapers coverage was still shaped by national characteristics. In 
Spain, for example, journalism paid considerable attention to the larger 
failures of national political culture as a root of the crisis. Considering the 
political developments in Spain – for example, the challenge presented to 
established parties by the populist left-wing Podemos, which has attacked the 
corrupted nature of established political forces (Kyriadikou and Garcia-Blanco 
2018) – this seems understandable.   
9.2 ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS DOMINATED THE 
DEBATE ON AUSTERITY 
Article II elaborates more on how powerful national and transnational 
institutions and traditions of economic policymaking influence the journalistic 
debate on austerity. By looking at the Finnish debate on economic policy 
between 2009 and 2014, article II shows how journalists coalesced around a 
consensus built by the dominant institutions of economic policymaking, 
namely the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the EU. 
Article II finds evidence for the notion that even during times of economic 
crises – which might potentially lead to the emergence of new economic policy 
paradigms – the debate on economic policy reflects the elite consensus. In 
Finland, the MoF has traditionally acted as the bureaucratic stronghold of 
Finnish economic policymaking, promoting ideas that highlight the 
importance of balanced budgets and national competitiveness (Pekkarinen 
and Heinonen 1998). The economic crisis of 1990s strengthened the position 
of the Mof as it developed into a policy entrepreneur for multi-party coalition 
government and devised the idea of long-term budgetary allocations, making 
it easier for curb public spending (Heikkinen and Tiihonen 2010; Kantola and 
Kananen 2013). Moreover, as a member of the EU and the eurozone, Finland 
has relinquished parts of its economic sovereignty to non-majoritarian 
European institutions, such as the ECB and European commission, leading to 
a strengthening of technocratic tendencies of Finnish economic policymaking. 
These developments have accelerated the depoliticization of economic 
policymaking. The strong institutional position of the Mof and EU work to 
shield demands of fiscal austerity and reforms from popular challenges. As 
Finnish parties and political elites from both the left and the right have 
traditionally been keen to subscribe to the MoF line (Kantola and Kananen 
2013), there is very little room for deviations from the orthodoxy. 
This is reflected by the results from article II, arguing that the public debate 
on Finnish economic policymaking follows the MoF/EU line. The study 
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illustrates this by identifying the main actors in the journalistic debate on 
austerity as well as the economic policy ideas voiced by the actors. The debate 
was dominated by such elite sources as government ministers, economists, 
government/opposition party politicians and officials. 
The economic policy ideas and views about the state of the Finnish 
economy largely reiterated the MoF/EU interpretation of the crisis. After a 
brief period of active fiscal stimulus to tame the effects of the global financial 
crisis, the fiscal policy stance turned towards austerity in 2010. In Finland, the 
MoF started to voice its concerns on excessive public deficits and prepare the 
public for belt-tightening. Instead of additional doses of debt-financed fiscal 
stimulus, Finland would have to start curbing its public expenditure and 
restoring competitiveness via supply-side structural reforms. In the pages of 
HS, calls for stimulus began to make room for a consensus on austerity and 
structural reforms. Leading politicians from both the social democratic party 
and the centre-right subscribed to the idea of necessary austerity. Few 
alternatives to austerity could be imagined, although after a recovery in 
economic output in 2010, the economic situation started to look increasingly 
dire towards the end of 2011.  
The results from article II are in line with the well-established notion that 
the limits of journalistic debate are dependent on the prevailing elite 
consensus or dissensus (Hallin 1984; Lounasmeri 2017). To be sure, HS gave 
room to dissidents and, for example, to economists who were critical of 
austerity, arguing that it will deepen the economic downturn. Overall, the 
debate was characterized by a one-sided view of the economic situation.    
9.3 AUSTERITY AS MODERNIZATION AND REASON 
Articles III and IV elaborate more on the relationship between journalism and 
austerity. Study IV examines how The Economist newspaper addressed 
austerity during the peak of the euro crisis between 2010 and 2012. With a 
discourse theory approach, it identifies three rhetorical strategies through 
which The Economist addressed the question of austerity amid the crisis: 
rational and moral austerity, anti-politics and austerity as modernization. 
Within the rhetorical strategy of rational and moral austerity, The 
Economist saw austerity as the necessary tool to combat the excessive deficits 
and levels of public debt in European countries. For The Economist, the dire 
state of public finances left no alternative to cutting public spending. However, 
The Economist also cultivated a critical debate on the timing and scaling of 
European austerity policies. The magazine was especially critical of Germany 
and its chancellor Angela Merkel. Germany and Merkel were criticized of 
adopting a fundamentalist hard-line stance on austerity and derailing any 
prospects of economic recovery in Europe. The Economist argued that instead 
of burdening crisis-hit European countries with ever-increasing austerity, 
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European economic policy should focus on competitiveness-enhancing 
structural reforms and a more balanced austerity position. 
The rhetorical strategy of anti-politics saw The Economist criticizing 
European decision-makers for their inability to commit to necessary austerity 
measures. According to this rhetorical strategy, politicians were often driven 
by populist impulses or electoral pressure that made it difficult for politicians 
to do what is necessary. Instead of addressing the problem of public debt or 
the structural dysfunctionalities of European welfare states, politicians were 
pandering to populist reflexes or blaming such unpopular groups as bankers 
for creating the crisis.   
The rhetorical strategy of austerity as modernization saw austerity and 
structural reforms as necessary to modernize the European welfare states to 
meet the conditions of a competitive global economy. The Economist, on many 
occasions, argued that the current structures of European welfare states were 
serving vested interests or insiders, the ones protected by strong labour unions 
or excessive regulation and bureaucratic red tape. These old structures should 
be modernized and reformed to serve the common good and the outsiders of 
the labour market, the migrant workers, and young people in precarious 
situations. 
Article III – which examines how The Economist has historically addressed 
the question of austerity – found similar results. Historically, The Economist 
has seen austerity as a necessary if yet a difficult solution to problems caused 
either by economic shocks or illiterate economic policy ideas. In post-World 
War II Britain, austerity, in the form of rationing private consumption, was 
needed to balance the British trade deficit. Although The Economist 
acknowledged the dire reality of Britons living under daily austerity, the 
economic conditions left no alternative to economic hardships. Moreover, 
austerity was needed to modernize the state-led economy of France in the 
1980s, ridden with sky-rocketing inflation and public deficits. The Economist 
represented austerity as way of bringing economic realism into a society vexed 
by an attachment to Keynesian economic policies. 
Indeed, article III reported that historically, journalism has had the 
tendency to juxtapose the apolitical economic logic of austerity with the often-
irrational nature of politics. The article argues that this has had to do with the 
professional values of journalism that have become central to the profession 
in the course of the 20th century. As the profession has sought to become the 
professional manager of the public sphere, it has placed itself above political 
passions and ideological confrontations. Journalism has developed a “realist 
style” (Phelan 2014, 87) when covering issues of economic policymaking. 
Thus, such economic policy ideas as austerity are often represented as simply 
the common-sense thing to do. Politicians or other actors that oppose austerity 
are, on the other hand, represented as watching over their own narrow 





As stated in the beginning of this synopsis chapter, the global financial crisis, 
the euro crisis and the austerity measures that followed marked a key moment 
for liberal democracies. Unpopular bank bailouts and austerity measures have 
challenged established political forces and nurtured populist politics. The 
populist surge has challenged such institutions as the EU that have furthered 
economic and political integration and steered global governance after the 
Second World War.  
This crisis of liberal politics intertwines closely with the current ills of 
journalism and democratic public communications. These predicaments 
manifest themselves in myriad concerns on the future of public 
communication. Some media scholars see such phenomena as fake news and 
post-truth as signs of a deteriorating public sphere where deliberation is no 
longer possible and expertise and factual evidence have lost their value 
(Dahlgren 2018). Due to digital communications, the public sphere is said to 
be splintering into partisan silos where neither consensus-building nor 
common problem-solving is possible. Democratic deliberation is making room 
for an overtly emotional public life in which identity politics overrides respect 
for facts. At the same time, authoritarian politicians and demagogues attack 
journalists as the enemies of the people. However, critics have noted how the 
panic concerning “fake news” and “post-truth” also works to externalize the 
crisis of liberal politics to external corruptive forces resorting to devious social 
media tactics to dupe the irrational masses (Collins 2019: Jutel 2019: Kreiss 
2018). However, the intense debate on the conditions of democratic debate 
signals that the very model of 20th century liberal public communication based 
on such ideals as reasonable deliberation is being challenged (Waisbord 2018). 
This model of public communication has dominated Western democracies 
during the latter half of the 20th century, and journalism has played a key part 
in this system (Blumler and Coleman 2015). Within this model, the often-
contradictory needs of democracy and the market could be mitigated. The 
profitable journalistic business model, supported by a lack of popular 
technological alternatives, could pay for resource-consuming critical 
journalism deemed essential for a functioning democracy (Curran 2007). 
Newsrooms could remain independent from marketing departments and 
partisan pressure. Furthermore, journalists could cope with the self-evident 
dilemma of being a part of the professional classes while remaining 
independent public watchdogs at the same time (Hallin 1992). Due to social 
democratic economic and social policies that aimed to redistribute wealth and 
mitigate conflicting material interests, it was easier to envisage a public that 
ultimately shared a similar vision of a common good. 
The cornerstones of the professional model have been in decline. Since the 
1980s, advances in mass media technologies have challenged the old media 
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model of information scarcity (Christians et al. 2009, 15). The internet and 
other advances in media technologies have made it possible for different forms 
of online counter-knowledge to circumvent journalistic moderation and the 
rules of a regulated public debate. This has, no doubt, been good news for 
critical alternative journalism. However, a fierce battle for engaged viewers, 
readers and listeners means that it is getting more difficult to sustain 
journalistic autonomy and objectivity from economic and political pressure 
(Hallin 2006). Indeed, the rise of Trump shows how such outlets as Fox News 
have discovered how lucrative it is to reach out to a culturally anxious white 
identity (Kreiss 2018). Of course, some new forms of journalism, such as news 
satire, have succeeded in bridging the gap between critical journalistic truth-
telling and entertainment (Baym 2009). 
The wider context for the crisis of liberal-democratic political 
communication is the rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s and the crisis of the 
Keynesian politico-economic project. Embodied by such politicians as 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, neoliberal7 politics challenged the 
cornerstones of the post-World War II consensus, built on such ideas as active 
state-led economic management and full employment. Neoliberals argued that 
the expansive welfare state would have to make room for a leaner state geared 
towards international competitiveness, deregulation and fiscal austerity.   
This affected media and journalism as well. The neoliberal decades have 
witnessed market-based solutions dominating media policy. The reduction of 
public monopolies has led the way when it comes to managing the media 
landscape. This has meant an end to the nationally regulated media model 
(Christians et al. 2009, 15). The well-established analysis is that journalistic 
autonomy and public interest have been undermined by increasing 
marketization and commodification of news, replacing critical content and 
commentary with infotainment and public spectacles (see Phelan 2014, 89). 
Policy approaches that have favoured deregulation and privatization in 
broadcasting and telecommunications have increased corporate ownership of 
the media. The democratic functions of journalism and media have been 
subordinated to an all-powerful market rationale (Hardy 2014, 58–64). 
Furthermore, Western societies have experienced rising levels of economic 
polarization (Piketty 2017; Nachtwey 2018). It has been argued that this has 
fuelled the public mistrust towards such traditional truth-tellers as experts 
and journalists (Davies 2018; Waisbord 2018). Therefore, it is increasingly 
difficult for journalism to reach a consensual mass public that would share a 
similar vision of the good society. 
The goal of this study was to address the nexus of journalism and 
democratic public communications through the lens provided by the economic 
                                                
7 Neoliberalism is a multi-faceted concept, and a comprehensive assessment of neoliberalism is 
beyond the scope of this work (for detailed analysis on neoliberalism, see Harvey 2005; Foucault 2008; 




crisis and austerity. I argue that the difficulties of journalism and democratic 
public communication should be addressed simultaneously with the “populist 
moment” (Waisbord 2018b) of Western politics, a development accelerated by 
the crisis and policies of austerity. I have argued that while the crisis disrupted 
the status quo of Western politics, it also opened a space for the public 
articulation of alternative policy ideas. Thus far, political forces from both the 
right and the left have made use of this opportunity. Whether they are anti-
immigrant right-wing ideas or calls for democratic socialism, new ideas are 
being laid out. Therefore, the crisis and austerity measures provide scholars 
with an intriguing opportunity to address the relationship between democracy 
and journalism.  The aim of this thesis is to consider whether this could be 
useful in figuring out how journalism might be better equipped to handle the 
inflammatory and highly conflictual 21st century public life. 
No doubt, the scholarship has already provided important insights and 
underlined how “runaway media commercialization” (Waisbord 2018b, 6) and 
the decline of nationally regulated media infrastructures have nurtured post-
truth public communications. Journalists are encouraged to engage in critical 
journalism, defend press freedom and take a firm stance against such anti-
democratic demagogues as Donald Trump (Benson 2018; Karpf 2018). The 
interest towards data journalism (Anderson 2018) is another attempt to 
restore journalism’s authoritative position as a curator of facts and critical 
analysis. 
However, the contribution this article-based thesis makes to this debate is 
the following: To envisage a positive vision for democratic journalism, we need 
to analyse the contradictory nature of the journalism-democracy nexus. I have 
examined these dynamics between journalism and democracy via four articles 
that analyse how professional journalism covered the policies of austerity that 
started to dominate European politics in 2010, briefly after the global financial 
crisis. Starting from the normative assumption that journalism has certain 
democratic duties, I was interested in examining the extent to which 
journalism offered differing interpretations about the crisis. Did it challenge 
the dominant view about necessary austerity? To what extent did European 
professional journalism succeed in fostering a pluralist debate on economic 
policy – a debate that would have included different politico-ideological views 
and solutions? 
According to this study, one must be rather critical. Journalism, no doubt, 
provided people with accurate information about the unfolding of the crisis. 
To be sure, critical analyses were written as well (see articles II, III and IV). 
However, the journalistic debate amid the euro crisis was dominated by a 
narrow view on austerity. The big picture is that journalism presented 
austerity as the necessary cure to the woes of European economies. Public 
spending cuts were needed to reduce public debt, restore competitiveness and 
signal the financial market that Europe was serious about getting its fiscal 
house in order. 
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The German tradition of ordoliberalism (Bonefeld 2012) was the dominant 
way of making sense of the euro crisis across the European public sphere 
(article I). The German government was able to use the European news media 
to circulate its interpretation of the crisis, according to which the roots of the 
predicament lie in excessive public indebtedness and in the uncompetitive 
nature of crisis-hit economies. Thus, austerity was needed to curb public debt 
and to regain competitiveness and market trust. An alternative reading of the 
crisis – dubbed as a “Keynesian” interpretation that would have emphasized 
the problematic structure of the eurozone and demanded a more active fiscal 
stance as a response to the crisis – was largely downplayed by European 
newspapers. 
What are the factors behind the one-sided nature of the debate? They are, 
no doubt, manifold and often repeated by journalism scholarship. First, it is 
obvious that journalism is dependent on the sources that provide journalists 
with the material from which news and analyses are constructed (article II). It 
is one of journalism’s functions to report on what the political decision-makers 
and other powerful groups think about issues of public importance. Therefore, 
it is somewhat natural that the views of those powerful groups dominate 
journalism and its accounts of economic policymaking. Indeed, “sources make 
the news” (Sigal 1986). 
Journalism scholarship has established that since the 1970s, financial and 
corporate interests have come to dominate economic news, reflecting the 
structural shifts (e.g. the decline of national industries) in the political 
economy and the growing importance of the financial sector’s power (Davis 
2018). Certain economic perspectives such as labour issues have been 
downplayed, while economic news has circulated narratives about the 
importance of deregulation, fiscal discipline and free trade (Mårtenson 2000; 
Durham 2007; Davis 2012). Scholars and journalists themselves have argued 
that financial journalists’ dependence on financial public relations, the 
difficulties of performing investigative journalism amid budget cuts and 
common-sense attitudes towards free-market ideas have contributed to the 
lack of critical journalism on the banking sector and the financialised global 
economy (Doyle 2006; Manning 2013). Berry’s (2019) comprehensive analysis 
on how the British broadcast and print media covered austerity and the global 
financial crisis brings to the fore the complex structure that affects the 
production of economic news. This nexus of factors includes, for example, 
varying ideological commitments, standardised sourcing practices, 
advertising incentives and the formation of an elite consensus that effectively 
sets limits on debate.  
The well-established dependency on elite sources creates a somewhat 
paradoxical situation for journalism. The very premise of professional 
journalism lies upon independence and autonomy from political and 
economic power. The history of professional journalism has seen journalists 
gaining autonomy from politics and economic power. As independent 
journalism has detached itself from partisan positions and inhabited a place 
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as the critical observer of politics, it has, however, become dependent on 
politicians, officials and various experts. Thus, journalistic representations 
often end up resembling the ideas voiced by these elites. 
Other factors need to be considered as well. Media scholars have long 
lamented how the political economy of the media has narrowed down the 
space for critical journalism. As publishers are trying to deal with declining 
advertising and subscription revenues, newsroom resources are being slashed. 
Obviously, this has made it more demanding for journalists to engage in 
challenging and time-consuming endeavours. Moreover, it is important to 
recall that journalism is a professional practice guided by organizational 
routines. Journalists need to stick with the professional practices that make 
the production of news and commentary possible. Journalism is, after all, an 
industry with practices that ensure a steady flow of the journalistic product 
(Tuchman 1978). So, while journalism scholars demand that professional 
journalists foster critical deliberation, ideological pluralism and civic 
engagement, they often neglect the daily constrains with which journalists 
need to operate (see Nielsen 2017). 
Moreover, central values of journalism carry certain tendencies that are 
problematic in terms of pluralist democratic debate. Critics have argued that 
professional journalism’s worldview is embedded in a “post-ideological” 
(Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017, 652–653) understanding of the social 
world. In professional journalism, expertise often overrides political conflicts 
and ideologies, and ideas that are deemed too far-out or radical are not 
deemed as legitimate political positions but are dismissed as extremist. In the 
case of austerity, it seems that for journalism, austerity has historically been a 
common-sense idea, a necessity demanded by the market logics or the 
workings of the economy. Articles III and IV show how journalism often 
addresses austerity as an economic necessity hollowed out of ideological or 
political implications. In journalism, economic reason or market logics are 
therefore juxtaposed against the selfish or irrational nature of politics and 
democratic procedures. The aim of journalism is often to shield the public 
from politicians whose economic policy initiatives are driven by vested 
interests or populism. Studies III and IV argue that this tendency is supported 





How to think of ways forward and develop democratic journalism? Mere 
criticism is clearly not enough. Critical scholarship has historically – and very 
much in line with this thesis – done a thorough job in showcasing how Western 
journalism, despite grandiose claims of democratic importance, often stifles 
democratic struggles and works to reproduce hegemonic views about the 
necessity of, for example, neoliberal politics. This thesis is no exception from 
this line of thought.  
The problem is that this does not feel very fruitful in the current impasse. 
It is important to critically dissect the working of professional journalism, but 
these critical accounts might often lead to sheer destructive cynicism that 
abandons professional journalism as inherently anti-democratic (Muhlmann 
2010). Critical accounts of journalism are often overtly deterministic and fail 
to give enough agency to professional journalism. The argument goes that as 
a commercial practise geared to profit-maximization, mainstream journalism 
is doomed to reproduce and disseminate elite ideas and neglect democratic 
concerns (see Phelan 2014, 88–90). 
Could theories on democracy and journalism help us rethink a way forward 
for journalism? Liberal and deliberative theories stress the importance of 
communicative freedoms, pluralism and deliberation. What is needed is a 
greater plurality of voices, leading to a more enlightened public sphere that 
better represents the will of the reasoned public. However, critical scholarship 
has shown that mere calls for pluralism are not enough if journalism offers a 
sanitised version of pluralism (Karppinen 2018). These calls become merely 
ideas that, despite their alleged pluralism, do not challenge the hegemonic 
assumptions underlying societies and their power structures (Raeijmaekers 
and Maeseele 2015; Fenton 2016). Moreover, liberal thought on the 
emancipatory, democratic potential of digital communication technologies 
and social media often overlooks that these tools are designed to maximise 
individual engagement with media content and to turn this engagement into 
unpaid digital labour and valuable data (Dean 2018; Couldry and Mejias 2019; 
Seymour 2019). Jodi Dean (2018) argues that digital media technologies, often 
heralded as technologies of liberation and democracy, should be treated as 
networks of ‘communicative capitalism’ that turn democratic and political 
passions into forms of individualistic media consumption and content 
production, thus using resources that could be employed for political 
organising. 
Natalie Fenton and Gavan Titley (2015) point out that calls for pluralism 
and communicative freedom tend to lead to media-centric analyses dismissive 
of the post-democratic tendencies of Western societies during the neoliberal 
era. The acceleration of neoliberal governance and the depoliticization of 
politics have made societies elite driven and unresponsive toward popular 
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democratic needs (Crouch 2004; Mouffe 2005; Mair 2013). Scholars have 
argued that political decision-making often takes place in isolation, 
circumventing journalistic watchdogs and public opinion (Philo et al. 2015). 
In short, the problem is that no amount of deliberation or plurality of voices is 
enough to affect the way in which the world is governed. The technocratic 
nature of Western politics was made blatantly clear during the euro crisis when 
non-majoritarian organisations such as the IMF, ECB and European 
Commission had essential roles in enforcing austerity policies. Thus, calls for 
liberal democratic values such as freedom of expression and plurality need to 
be coupled with analyses of the workings of the political economy (Fenton and 
Titley 2015). 
However, as William Davies (2018) argues, the Brexit vote and the Trump 
presidency have repoliticized the global economy and dethroned the 
technocratic class of central bankers and economists. The populist moment 
means that questions on the architecture of the global economy are no longer 
resolved solely by free-trade deals and experts detached from the political 
realm but also by popular passions. Various developments in the global 
economy have accelerated the politicization of economic issues. For example, 
the prolonged post-crisis period of low interest rates and feeble inflation has 
affected the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Thus, Mario Draghi, head of the ECB, has called for European governments to 
engage in fiscal spending to boost inflation.8 This indeed is a far cry from the 
heyday of the austerity fad. 
As reporting tends to follow the boundaries set by key political and 
economic elites (see Hallin 1984; Lounasmeri 2017), the mutations and 
fractures in elite opinion undoubtedly will also impact journalism and 
economic news. For instance, questions concerning European monetary and 
fiscal policy will become public controversies and fodder for inter-elite 
disputes. Indeed, The Financial Times’ call in 2019 for a ‘reset’ of capitalism9 
can be read as a sign of elite concern. Something needs to be done about global 
inequality to ensure the legitimacy of free-market ideas in the eyes of the 
austerity-ridden masses. The debate on economic policy is further fuelled by 
acute concerns about climate change. What kinds of economic policies should 
be enacted to mitigate the effects of climate change and fund the investments 
needed for a just transformation of the economy?  
In a new setting, a more agonistic approach towards journalism and 
democracy could be fruitful. The agonistic approach owes to political 
philosopher Chantal Mouffe who argues that the turmoil of Western societies, 
manifested, for example, by the rise of right-wing populism, has to do with the 
overtly consensual nature of post-cold War liberal democracies (Mouffe 2005; 
                                                
8 Bloomberg 29.9.2019 “Draghi Says ECB Has Room to Do More, But Needs Fiscal Backup” 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-29/draghi-urges-closer-fiscal-
union-higher-government-spending) 
9 Financial Times, “This is the new agenda” (https://aboutus.ft.com/en-gb/new-agenda/) 
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2018). The argument is that since the fall of socialism, Western democracies 
have been characterized by a post-political stasis. As the left has subscribed to 
neoliberal globalization as well, societies are deprived of democratic 
alternatives. Political conflicts have lost their characters as clashes between 
differing democratic projects. 
Mouffe’s line of thought provides us with a way of understanding the 
current turmoil of public communications and the emphasis on politics of 
difference and “identity politics” (see Haider 2018). As politics were declined 
of the conflictual dimension where varying hegemonic demands on, for 
example, the economy could be articulated, political conflicts lost their 
democratic character. They turned into confrontations “between non-
negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of identification” (Mouffe 2013, 
7). The argument is that when political passions and political identity-building 
could not be articulated in the form of varying democratic and politico-
ideological demands, identity-building became a question of seeking 
differences merely based on race, gender, ethnicity or religion. 
Mouffe therefore stresses that the goal of democratic politics is to tame 
“antagonism” (conflictual dynamics inherent to all social life) into the form of 
an “agonism” (a struggle between adversaries who share a commitment to 
democratic principles). This does not entail that the aim of democratic politics 
is to erase conflicts via reason and argumentation. Rather, the goal of 
democracy is to “sublimate” (Mouffe 2013, 9) passions via structuring 
collective forms of identifications around different democratic demands. 
Should the political community lack these democratic demands, political 
conflicts take the form of an antagonism between “enemies” (ibid., 9). In an 
antagonistic setting, the enemy is not a legitimate democratic adversary but 
someone who proposes an essentialist threat and must thus be destroyed. 
Drawing from Mouffe’s line of thought, scholars have argued that the 
democratic role of the media is to foster ideological contestation between 
different democratic and hegemonic projects (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 
2015; Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017). Journalism should work to open 
spaces for democratic contestation. The self-evident nature of austerity 
policies, for example, should be challenged by actively analysing the workings 
of the political economy from various perspectives. 
To bring this argument closer to journalism practise, one can build on 
Géraldine Muhlmann’s differentiation (2008; 2010) between a journalism 
that “unifies” and a journalism that “decentres”. Muhlmann argues that 
historically, professional journalism has been divided between these two 
poles. With the rise of the popular press, the ideal-typical journalist has been 
the unifying one who has sought to bring together a vast amount of readers, 
listeners or spectators to form a common “we”, the centre of political life. 
Muhlmann (2008, 95–111) illustrates this with the example of the famous 
American broadcast journalist Edward Murrow, who took on the U.S Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, famous for his anti-communist investigations and 
accusations in the 1950s. The aim of Murrow’s TV journalism was to expose 
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the untruthful nature of McCarthyism and “re-centre” (Muhlmann 2008, 100) 
the American “we”, de-centred by McCarthy’s false accusations and his 
attempts to disintegrate the communists from the American public. Murrow, 
through exposing the fabricated nature of McCarthy’s claims, sought to 
consolidate the American public and bring those falsely accused of communist 
sympathies back to the community. The public was, again, centred against the 
decentring figure of McCarthy who attempted to sow conflict within the 
essentially anti-communist American public. 
On the other hand, journalism can work to “de-centre” by pinpointing the 
conflicts and differing material interests that divide the political community. 
Muhlmann (2008, 135–194) traces the roots of a more de-centrifying mode of 
journalism to the adversarial culture of the 1960s and 1970s. The adversarial 
culture accelerated the disillusionment with the objectifying project of 
journalism. Those in favour of a more adversarial reporting argued that 
journalism should de-centre the “bourgeois public” (ibid., 71) by portraying 
the contradictions and class conflicts inherent in society. Importantly, 
decentring journalism is underpinned by a different view on politics than 
centring journalism: politics is about “conflictuality which does not create any 
community” (Muhlman 2010, 188).  Instead of attempting to create a 
consensual we, journalism should portray the antagonist nature of the society 
to make room for different democratic demands. 
As I have argued, amid politico-economic flux and the technological shifts 
underpinning our media life – characterized by increasing hybridity between 
traditional media and digital media landscapes (Chadwick 2013) – it is 
difficult for journalism to reclaim the role it had in the Western societies in the 
mid-20th century. As political, economic and technological fundamentals of 
professional journalism are undergoing major shifts, journalism should not 
take its traditional function as the authoritative truth-teller and democratic 
watchdog as self-evident. Indeed, to protect and develop what is important in 
journalism in terms of democratic life, journalism should perhaps adopt a 
more de-centring role in a world shook by the return of radical politics and 
alternatives to established political thought. Perhaps journalism should tone 
down on the “aghast” (Freedman 2018, 604) on the populist rupture and adopt 
a de-centring tone that would analyse the contradictions and fractions that 
underpin early 21st century Western societies. 
This is, no doubt, a demanding task. It is unclear whether there is room for 
manoeuvring in a highly competitive media environment where resources are 
increasingly scarce. How can we rethink established hiring practices to create 
more newsroom diversity, and how can we diverge from established sourcing 
patterns to steer clear from overly consensual journalism? Bringing up issues 
that might sometimes contradict common wisdom on such issues as economic 
policy is difficult for journalists for whom such values as neutrality and 
factuality are of upmost importance. How can these ideas be implemented in 
newsroom practices or in journalism schools? This is a gargantuan task in a 
media environment that is much more fractured and dispersed than the 
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regulated media sphere of the 20th century. Therefore, no easy fixes lay ahead. 
In addition to developing journalism practice, questions concerning media 
policy and economic policy need to be incorporated into the debate. 
Other issues arise, too. As media spheres dominated by well-established 
journalistic organisations give way to a more fragmented public life, it is 
reasonable to ask whether the focus of analysis should be different. When 
calling for a journalistic culture more attuned to the new era of antagonisms, 
perhaps we should look to the counter-hegemonic and partisan journalistic 
outlets that have taken on the established press since the financial crisis and 
amid populist turmoil.10 Perhaps a plethora of partisan outlets can articulate 
political demands and various radical “counter-publics” (Karppinen 2009, 58) 
that can contribute to an ideologically pluralistic public sphere. Without a 
doubt, established media institutions with the capacity to engage in resource-
consuming watchdog journalism are still very much needed. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to argue whether the agonistic approach is the 
way forward. One can argue that the radical critique towards the consensual 
features of liberal democracy has been “tipped over” (Dahlgren 2018, 26) in a 
world that seems fragmented and overtly hostile, incapable of determined 
action to tackle such existentialist threats as climate change. Therefore, the 
ability to build compromises and consensuses through deliberation could be 
more crucial than ever. Here, two lines of thought can be pinpointed. The 
consensus-building perspective stresses the importance of communication 
strategies and forums where ideological polarization can be diffused while the 
critical perspective emphasizes the importance of ideological contestation to 
envisage alternative futures (Pepermans and Maeseele 2016). 
One can also reasonably question whether the relationship between 
deliberative strands of democratic thought and more radical perspectives is as 
agonistic as sometimes stated by scholars such as Mouffe. Lincoln Dahlberg 
(2005) argues that the radical-pluralist critique of deliberative democratic 
theory—according to which the emphasis on consensus and rationalist modes 
of communication excludes alternative voices—is partly based on a poor 
reading of deliberative thinkers as such Habermas. Not all deliberative 
democrats are dismissive of the notion that the discourse in public sphere 
involves confrontation (Dahlberg 2005, 127). It, therefore, is a 
mischaracterisation to state that deliberative theory categorically dismisses 
questions of power and exclusion. Instead, a deliberative public sphere is an 
ideal that can be useful in pinpointing forms of domination and reducing 
forms of exclusion. Indeed, in stating that that public debate entails conflicts 
and domination, deliberative theory is somewhat akin to the agonistic 
approach. It, however, seems that agonistic thinkers emphasise the 
importance of fostering different ideological positions, whereas deliberative 
                                                





theory “continues to rely on [a] rational consensus as a regulative ideal” 
(Karppinen 2009, 57). 
The way forward for democratic public communications is a topic for 
further inquiry. I do, however, think that moving towards the values of 
decentring might help to vitalize journalism and democratic communications. 
Importantly, giving voice to various politico-ideological projects and 
contestations that have emerged since the financial crisis would not mean that 
journalism would need to give up on such values as truthfulness or factuality. 
On the contrary, it would be an opportunity for journalism to strengthen its 
role as a democratic organ by shedding light on contradictions and conflicts 
that have emerged in the aftermath of austerity. Moreover, it might even have 
a healthy effect on democratic life which seems to have been taken over by 
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